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Unreasonable Revelations: God Told Me to Kill
Linda Ross Meyer*

In 1997, Christopher Turgeon, prophet of the Gatekeepers,
and his co-congregant, Blaine Applin, heard the voice of God
telling them to kill Dan Jess, a former member of their religious
group.1 Together, Chris and Blaine drove from California to
Dan’s house in Washington, praying for a sign that they were
doing the right thing; they saw seven rainbows.2 When Dan
answered his door, Blaine shot and killed him.3 Afterwards,
Chris and Blaine felt a sense of peace and assurance that they
had done the right thing.4
Did God really speak? Should Chris and Blaine be guilty of
murder? What does the law do when its “reason” is called into
question by a religious revelation that claims authority and
moral certainty superior to and contrary to law? We seem to be
living in a time when this question is a common one. The
authority of the law, rule of law, and legal institutions depend
on the existence of a shared common sense of reasonable people,
reasonable argument, rational basis, reasonable doubt, and
reasonable interpretation – i.e., a unifying nomos of reason.
However, in the wake of religious violence, in the assertion of
rights to legal exceptions on religious grounds, and in a
religiously grounded backlash against science, the press, and
university education,5 we are experiencing revelation’s
Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law. I would like to thank
Steve Gilles, Neal Feigenson, Stan Krauss, Kevin Barry, Jeffrey Cooper,
Austin Voss, Caroline Meckel, Ian Ayres, Trisha Olson, Paul Lombardo, Russ
Covey, Bill Edmundson, Neil Kinkopf, Jeff Meyer, and many other colleagues
at Quinnipiac and at Georgia State Law School, who gave me excellent
comments on earlier versions of this paper. Despite their assistance, it is not
divinely inspired (as far as I know).
1. State v. Applin, 67 P.3d 1152, 1153 (Wash. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Though not framed that way, the antipathy to educational institutions
appears to be an inter-religion dispute rather than religion-versus-”secular
*
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challenge to reason and law anew, though not for the first time.
The shared normative ground that the law depends upon is at
stake.
This Article focuses on one extreme example of the law’s
response to unreasonable revelations that is starkly presented
in a series of unsettling murders: those involving criminal
defendants who claim they committed their crime because God
told them to do it—known as “deific decree” cases.6 This example
of the conflict between revelation and reason tests the limits of
law’s ability to understand and countenance revelation when the
stakes are highest. The deific decree cases also present the
hardest epistemological problems, because the defendant claims
that the experience of God’s command is self-authenticating—a
position fundamentally at odds with both scientific and legal
standards of proof.
Hearing commands from God in this context is
characterized by almost all courts and commentators as a sign
of mental illness. Yet nearly a third of Americans believe that
God speaks directly to them in personal revelation or prayer,
some seeing an image and/or hearing an actual voice and words,
others experiencing a “thought-insertion” from “outside”
themselves.7 Moreover, the facts of these cases are similar to
stories or examples from the western cultural record in which
we rarely dismiss the God-hearing protagonists as insane. To
mention only a few: Jesus, Abraham, Joshua, Moses, Joan of
Arc, John Brown, and various historical Popes are usually not
presumed to be insane, but rather sane, honest, and, for the
humanist.” A Pew Trust study found that college-educated and non-college
educated people attend religious services at roughly the same rate. Chapter 2:
Religious Practices and Experiences, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/chapter-2-religious-practices-andexperiences/#private-devotions. The difference comes in the practices and
doctrines of the services they attend. As before and during the Civil War,
churches are divided, too, separating into red and blue branches, each accusing
the other of heresy. EDWIN GAUSTAD & LEIGH SCHMIDT, THE RELIGIOUS HISTORY
OF AMERICA: THE HEART OF THE AMERICAN STORY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO
TODAY 191 (2002).
6. Applin, 67 P.3d. at 1153–54.
7. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape
Survey: Religious Beliefs and Practices, June 1, 2008, at 53; TANYA MARIE
LUHRMANN, WHEN GOD TALKS BACK: UNDERSTANDING THE AMERICAN
EVANGELICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH GOD 50–51, 211–15, 250–52 (2012).
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faithful, true recipients of God’s commands. Many of these
revered figures have even committed homicides purportedly at
God’s behest.
This classic criminal law problem of deific decree murder is
in many ways parallel to claims of religious free exercise8 rights
in cases where a defendant refuses to follow laws and social
customs for religious reasons.
In this area, we usually
acknowledge that the law is unable to distinguish the true
revelation from the false and is limited to distinguishing the
sincere believer from the insincere.9 In many areas where
religion is set up as a defense to lesser crimes or legal
obligations, the law may blink by using discretionary doctrines
to avoid a direct conflict between law and revelation, or by
allowing some free exercise exceptions for religious practices
that cause little harm.10 Accommodation becomes more difficult
when the stakes are higher, as when law’s own norms of equal
treatment are challenged. In murder cases, the conflict becomes
acute: we cannot avoid or soften the conflict between reason and
revelation, and the sincere believer is a serious threat. Though
the state could certainly assert a “compelling interest” in
refusing to accommodate a homicide,11 if the state were actually
persuaded that the homicide was divinely ordered, its
compelling interest in preventing it would be open to question.
Presuming the believer insane is the law’s dodge here—but it is
one that would not be acceptable in most free exercise cases

8. See Rabia Belt, When God Demands Blood: Unusual Minds and the
Troubled Juridical Ties of Religion, Madness, and Culpability, 69 UNIV. MIAMI
L. REV. 755, 773–76 (2015) (pointing out that courts take a subjective approach
to the definition of religion in free exercise cases).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)(adopting a broad
understanding of religion in the context of the Universal Military Training and
Service Act and emphasizing the importance of adjudicating the sincerity and
good faith of conscientious objectors, rather than trying to specify the outer
limits of “religious training and belief”).
10. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 (restricted by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997),
to require only the federal government to accommodate religious practices
unless it has a compelling interest and narrowly tailored rule); Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, codified at § 2000cc-1 (stating
that substantial burdens on religious practices of institutionalized persons
must be justified by a compelling interest and regulations narrowly tailored).
11. Id.
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because of its implication that a sincere belief in revelation is
insane.
Most cases and commentators do not take deific decree
claims seriously as true revelation, but instead helpfully and
carefully parse deific decree murders as various kinds of
insanity claims.12 This Article argues that this is the wrong
frame in which to consider these cases. The doctrinal conclusion
supported here instead is that assessing someone’s claim of
“revelation” as insane or not is not within the jurisdiction of law
and, therefore, a claim of deific command, absent other evidence
of insanity, cannot be grounds for exculpation either as an
excuse or as a justification, though the circumstances may be
grounds for mercy or mitigation. However, the more important
insight is that the chaotic nature of the divine cannot be
contained within law, whether the law is the law of a church or
of a state.13 Rather, the divine exists beyond the bounds of both
church and state law.
This conclusion also entails that the legal status of the deific
decree defense should have no relevance to the Establishment
Clause, for establishing a church requires law, and law of any
kind resists revelation (a deep irony implicit in any established
religious tradition). Moreover, seen from the prism of the deific
decree doctrine, much of the rhetoric about how much religion
we should or should not have in the public square is not about
God at all: it is a dispute between legal traditions about which
12. For commentary, see Christopher Hawthorne, “Deific Decree”: The
Short, Happy Life of a Pseudo-Doctrine, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1755 (2000); see
also Belt, supra note 8 (highlighting the problem with the distinction between
genuine revelation and madness, drawing on Grant Morris and Ansar Haroun,
infra).
However, Belt’s primary concern involves expanding insanity
exculpations, as she concludes that a deific decree exception “unacceptably
privileges certain mentally ill criminal defendants whose delusions fit within
an outdated model.” Id.; Andrew J. Demko, Note, Abraham’s Deific Defense:
Problems with Insanity, Faith, and Knowing Right from Wrong, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1961 (2005) (struggling more directly with the revelation issue);
Stephen Garvey, Agency and Insanity, 66 BUFF L. REV. 123 (2018) (likening
traditional insanity doctrine, including deific decree, to a loss of a sense of
agency); Grant H. Morris & Ansar Haroun, “God Told Me to Kill”: Religion or
Delusion?, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 973 (2001) (taking the “genuine revelation”
problem more seriously, but focusing primarily on the parallel problem in
psychiatry). For cases, see infra note 18.
13. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
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laws should govern us. Neither legal nor religious institutions
can claim an ineffable higher ground; both fall back on appeals
to authority, tradition, text, and reason. It should not come as a
surprise, then, that God escapes law completely, whether it is
the law of a church or of a state.14 Instead, the question that
deific decree cases pose is how much protection should law give
the insight, conscience, and experience of the divinely-addressed
individual. Considered in this light, the deific decree defense
cannot be legalized, as the law cannot pronounce on the
existence of the divine, nor discern revelation from rebellion.
Revelation is beyond law, and those in its thrall can appeal only
to mercy (understood here as law’s self-recognition of the limits
of law).
Introduction: The Traditional Insanity
Frame and the Deific Decree “Exception”
The classic and most widely-accepted M’Naghten test of
insanity requires that, before a defendant may be acquitted as
insane, he must show that he was “labouring under such a defect
of reason . . . as not to know the nature and quality of the act. . .
; or . . . that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” 15
The defendant who knows his act is wrong,16 but does it anyway
because God told him to do it, presents this stark conflict
between human law, reason, or custom’s claim to define wrong,
and divine revelation to the contrary. Nor does the traditional
insanity doctrine allow room to argue divine compulsion:
M’Naghten does not allow volitional defenses, but, in
straightforward Kantian fashion, presumes that if you know the
law and the facts, you are rational and thereby have the free will
14. “[Aslan is n]ot like a tame lion.” C.S. LEWIS, THE LION, THE WITCH,
97 (Samizdat 2017) (1950) (emphasis in original).
15. R. v. M’Naghten, (1843) 10 CI. & F 200 (HL). The factors are not
dissimilar from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics III(a): ignorance of one’s
agency, the thing or person affected, the instrument that brought about the
result, the effects of the act, and the quality of the act. See ROBINSON, infra
note 24 at 25.
16. Courts differ about whether it is only necessary that he know his act
to be against the positive law or also that he know the act is against the social
customs (nomos, reason) of his community. See discussion infra pts. II(A),
Conclusion.
AND THE WARDROBE
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to do the right thing.17 To know is to be free; to be free is to be
able to act on your knowledge of right and wrong, regardless of
what anyone else tells you—even God.
There are quite a surprising number of murder and
attempted murder cases involving claims that a defendant was
acting against the law (and/or against social mores) because of a
deific decree or divine command, and in all of the reported cases,
these defendants purport to be following Christian practices, not
those of other faiths.18 In some cases, these defendants ask to
17. M’Naghten, 10 CI. & F; see also note 336.
18. See, e.g., Wilson v. Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347 (7th Cir. 2010); Turgeon v.
Garcia, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21833 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2007); Guiteau’s Case,
10 F. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1882); Archie v. State, 875 So. 2d 336 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App.
2003); Ivery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); State v.
Malumphy, 461 P.2d 677 (Ariz. 1969); People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752 (Cal.
1985); People v. Coddington, 2 P.3d 1081 (Cal. 2000), overruled by Price v.
Superior Court, 25 P.3d 618 (Cal. 2001); People v. Applin, 2001 Cal. LEXIS
7416 (Cal. Oct. 31, 2001); People v. Duckett, 209 Cal. Rptr. 96 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172
(Colo. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Galimanis, 944 P.2d 626 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997);
People v. Kando, 921 N.E.2d 1166 (Ill. Ct. App. Ct. 2009); People v. Wilhoite,
592 N.E.2d 48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Garcia, 509 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987); Laney v. State, 486 So. 2d 1242 (Miss. 1968); State v. Blair, 732 A.2d
448 (N.H. 1999); State v. Singleton, 48 A.3d 285 (N.J. 2012); State v. Worlock,
569 A.2d 1314 (N.J. 1990); People v. Wood, 187 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1962); People
v. Schmidt, 101 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915); Galloway v. State, 698 P.2d 940 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1985); Olivier v. State, 850 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); State
v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342 (Utah 2001); State v. Applin, 82 P.3d 243 (Wash. 2004);
State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889 (Wash. 1988); State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650
(Wash. 1983); State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983); State v. Turgeon,
2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 1370 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2004); State v. Potter,
842 P.2d 481 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). There are also earlier cases that formed
the basis of the novel, Weiland, discussed infra Section II(D), including ones
involving John Yates, William Beadle, and Thomas Goss in 1785, and John
Pastano in 1799 in New York. See infra Section II(D). A case of “God told me
to” (but where deific decree doctrine was not invoked) include a truck driver
who killed two in a rear-ender claimed God told him to do it and also begged
officers to kill him. Associated Press, Suspect Says ‘God Told Me to Do it’ After
Fatal Crash, FOX NEWS (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/01/27
/suspect-says-god-told-me-to-do-it-after-fatal-crash.html. Andrea Yates killed
her children in order to send them to heaven, Psychiatrist: Yates thought she
was defeating Satan, CNN (March 1, 2002), and Zacarias Moussaoui conspired
with 9/11 terrorists as part of a religiously inspired jihad. Richard Serrano,
Life of a Terrorist: Seeking, and Finding, His Jihad, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2006),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2006-apr-24-na-moussaoui24-story
.html. I’m not aware of a case in which a lawyer was bold enough to assert a
deific decree defense in an Islamic jihad case (a telling point for the claim made
that the defense favors Christianity over other religions) but it is certainly
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be acquitted under a special deific decree exception to
M’Naghten or on the ground that the command of God skewed
their understanding of moral wrong.19 In other cases, the
defendants ask to be acquitted under a less well-accepted
volitional test of insanity, such as the Model Penal Code’s
“lacked substantial capacity” to conform to law, or Durham’s
“product of mental disease”20 test, or an “irresistible impulse” to
commit the crime. Other cases resist the deific decree exception
and insist that defendants who know the act to be illegal are
guilty, regardless of whether they were commanded by a deity. 21

within the realm of doctrinal fit. See Belt, supra note 8; Hawthorne, supra note
12, Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347. The International Criminal Court is struggling with
a similar issue in the case of Dominic Ongwen, the kidnapped child-soldier who
later directed and performed torture and genocide as a commander in Joseph
Kony’s Lord’s Army. Other members of the Lord’s Army have testified that
Kony induced the belief in these young soldiers that he was possessed of spirits
who would know even of disloyal thoughts. The children were taught to believe
that they, too, were possessed of spirits that spoke to them in dreams, allowed
visions of the future, and rendered them bulletproof. See Kristof Titeca, I
Testified at the Trial of One of Joseph Kony’s Commanders. Here’s What the
Court
Didn’t
Understand,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
17,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/17/itestified-at-the-icc-trial-of-one-of-joseph-konys-commanders-heres-what-thelaw-doesnt-seem-to-understand/?utm_term=.65647f9ad9af. In August 2018,
in a strange twist on these cases, James John Todd Kincannon in South
Carolina killed his parents’ beagle-mix because God told him to. Megan
Cerullo, Former Republican Politician Said he Killed Parents Dog on
Command from God, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 4, 2018, 1:00 PM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/ny-news-republican-politician-killsdog-20180804-story.html.
19. See, e.g., State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983) (“deific
decree” exception); see also People v. Kando, 921 N.E.2d 1166, 1191 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2009) (skewed understanding of moral wrong); People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d
752 (Cal. 1985) (same).
20. People v. Rice, 757 P.2d 899, 904 (Wash. 1988) (insufficient evidence
that will was “subsumed” by divine command to require deific decree
instruction); State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983) (free will
“subsumed” by divine command). However, the Appellate Court later stated
in State v. Potter, 842 P.2d 481 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), that this is not a
volitional test, but that the command skewed cognitive ability to understand
wrong. See also People v. Garcia, 509 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (“Astros”
command deprived defendant of “ability to conform” conduct, using MPC
standard), abrogated by statute as described in Wilson v. Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347,
354 (7th Cir. 2010); cf. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
abrogated by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
superseded by 18 U.S.C.A. § 17 (reinstating M’Naghten in federal courts).
21. People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992) (Vollack, J., dissenting).
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The deific decree cases are sometimes thought to be a legal
anomaly, ginned into modern doctrine by Cardozo dicta and the
Kadish Criminal Law casebook’s wide dissemination of State v.
Crenshaw.22 But in fact, the uniqueness of the deific decree
murder has a long and tangled history that is illuminating. Part
I of this Article works to untangle a bit of that history. Part II
provides a taxonomy of the problem, not historically or by
doctrinal resolutions, but rather by how the cases and judges
express the relationship between revelation and law. There are
many ways in which the law might, and has, responded to deific
decree cases. This Article groups the materials into five types,
related to the way in which the law reacts to claims of revelation:
1. Revelation is treated as insanity;
2. Only revelation that goes against the law is treated as
insanity (or depravity);
3. Revelation is treated as something that, if true, would
supersede law;
4. Revelation is treated as the only ground of truth; and
5. Revelation is treated as beyond the jurisdiction of law.
This Article will give both a legal example of each category
and a philosophical analysis that ties the category to more
general ideas about reason and revelation. In doing so, the
Article will also compare how a few established religious
traditions handle the same problem. The goal of this exercise is
not solely to improve legal doctrine in deific decree cases, but to
point out that both legal and religious institutions struggle with
the problem of unreasonable revelations, and in much the same
way. What emerges from a close examination of the cases is that
the conflict between law and revelation is not necessarily a
conflict between (secular) law and (organized) religion, but
between ethical communities and individual (divine?) insight.
As such, the conflict here has roots in ancient debates about the
nature of God, enthusiasm and evangelical movements
throughout history, early American debates over styles of
religious dialogue, natural law, and populism,23 as well as roots
22. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488; see also Hawthorne, supra note 12.
23. CALEB SMITH, THE ORACLE AND THE CURSE: A POETICS OF JUSTICE FROM
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in the ever-renewed conflict between the individual and the
community.
I. Origins of the Deific Decree Doctrine
Historian Daniel Robinson points out that the original form
of an exculpatory insanity defense was entheos, or having a god
within—which would make deific decree the prototype, not the
outlier, of insanity defenses. Throughout the Illiad, Homer’s
characters, Helen and Achilles, exculpate themselves by
claiming to be inhabited at times by divine entities: “The god
might speak only to the chosen one, exciting wild and
uncoordinated movements; or induce a frenzy as the sign of
divine anger; or lead the victim to speak in tongues.”24 Later
under Roman law, this entheos was fanaticus or dementia—a
divine madness that would come and go (as, perhaps, epilepsy
does)—as opposed to furiosus or a more general and unremitting
madness like that associated with rabies.25
THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR

105 (Harv. Univ. Press 2013).
24. DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS AND IDLE HUMOURS: THE INSANITY
DEFENSE FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 9 (1996). Stephen Garvey has
recently picked up on a variant of this ancient idea, arguing that much of
insanity doctrine, including the facts in the M’Naghten case itself, should be
understood as a loss of one’s sense of agency, not a loss of reason, Garvey, supra
note 12, at 157 (explicitly pointing to the deific decree doctrine as an instance
of his new theory as experiencing a sense of a loss of agency to God, though he
would extend the doctrine to all command hallucinations); Id. at 168.
25. “Categories of mental competence were used to partition defendants
in Roman law: non compos mentis, fanaticus, ideotus, furiosus.” OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY & PSYCHIATRY 20 (K. W. M. Fulford et al. eds., 2013)
[hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK]. Justinian contrasts dementia and furiosus
rather than fanaticus and furiosus. See infra note 30. See Dorothy May
Paschall, The Vocabulary of Mental Aberration in Roman Comedy and
Petronius, 15 LANGUAGE 4, 57 (1939) (“That the barbaric ceremonial of these
[Cybele] cults made a great impression on the Romans however is shown by
the word fanaticus which, meaning literally a ‘person attached to a temple,’
referred to the devotees of the Oriental religions par excellence. The
metaphorical use of the word is rare, and limited to cases in which some notion
of religious madness can be found. Cicero uses it twice, both times in
connection with superstitio . . . . In Christian writings, fanaticus came to be
merely a synonym of gentilis or ‘pagan’” (footnotes omitted)). Voltaire’s much
later rant about “fanaticus” may or may not illuminate its meaning so much as
prefigure the “melancholy madness” attributed to religious enthusiasms in the
eighteenth century. See VOLTAIRE, 3 PHILOSOPH. DICTIONARY “Fanaticism”
(1764) (stating “[w]e understand by fanaticism at present a religious madness,
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In all these ancient texts, insanity was an excuse defense
against criminal punishment, even if the affliction was
intermittent, as long as the person was completely without
understanding at the time of the criminal act.26 In Roman law,
gloomy and cruel. It is a malady of the mind, which is taken in the same way
as smallpox. . . . Fanaticism is, in reference to superstition, what delirium is to
fever, or rage to anger. He who is involved in ecstasies and visions, who takes
dreams for realities, and his own imaginations for prophecies, is a fanatical
novice of great hope and promise, and will probably soon advance to the highest
form, and kill man for the love of God”); see also John F. Sena, “Melancholic
Madness and the Puritans,” 66 HARV. THEOLOGICAL REV.
293 (1973)
(“Melancholia” was attributed to Puritan out-groups). There is also mention of
fanaticus in The Empyrean Canopy, an 1864 treatise on insanity, which
diagnoses it as: “seeing visions wild and extravagant, in religious views, excess
of enthusiasm, exhibiting strange motions and postures, vehement vociferation
in worship, pretending to inspiration, or to have intercourse with superior
beings, governed by imaginations rather than judgment and reasonable proof.
Fanaticism is not so much a belief, as it is a strenuous and angry maintainance
[sic] of a belief which has for its foundation no reasonable proof . . . . People in
the church and out of it have been very zealous in using the epithet of insanity.
Insanity is the plea, used now, in 1864, in church and out of it, for defamation.
All of the above terms have been made use of by evil persons, to destroy the
influence of truth, and defame character, used as an epithet to obliterate, rob,
and destroy.” WILLIAM M. PRIOR, THE EMPYREAN CANOPY 38–39 (1864).
Another reference from 1864 is found in Denny v. Denny, a suit for divorce in
which the wife’s children sought to be appointed guardians ad litem and
dismiss her suit. 90 Mass. 311, 312–14 (Mass. 1864) (“In Malin v. Malin . . .
the chancellor says, ‘a person incompetent to protect himself, from age or
weakness of mind, or from some religious delusion or fanaticism . . . ought to
come under the protection of the court.’” (citations omitted)).
26. 1 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 59–60 (Charles Henry Monro trans., 1904)
(The Divine Marcus and Commodus issued a rescript to Scapula Tertullus in
these words: “If you have clearly ascertained that AElius Priscus is in such a
state of insanity [furor] that he is permanently out of his mind [continua mentis
alienatione omni intellectu careat] and so entirely incapable of reasoning, and
no suspicion is left that he was simulating insanity [dementiae] when he killed
his mother, you need not concern yourself with the question of how he should
be punished, as his insanity [furor] itself is punishment enough. At the same
time he must be closely confined, and if you think it advisable, even kept in
chains; this need not be done by way of punishment so much as for his own
protection and the security of his neighbours. If however, as is very often the
case, he has intervals of sounder mind, you must carefully investigate the
question whether he may not have committed the crime on one of these
occasions, and so have no claim to mercy on the ground of mental infirmity;
and, if you should find that anything of his kind is the fact you must refer the
case to us, so that we may consider, supposing he committed the act at a
moment when he could be held to know what he was doing, whether he ought
not to be visited with punishment corresponding to the enormity of his crime.
But when we learn by a letter from you that his position in respect of place and
treatment is such that he is in the hands of his friends, even if confined to his
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insanity was compared to infancy, for a child who lacked basic
understanding of right and wrong could not be convicted, as well
as to idiotus, or a person who did not have sufficient
understanding of fact to be responsible.27
Thus, as in
contemporary formulations, including M’Naghten, knowledge of
both law and fact was prerequisite to punishment. Intermittent
forms of insanity that resembled spiritual possession, or demens,
like epilepsy, were not completely legally disabling: not only
could one be guilty of a crime if one were momentarily lucid, but
one could also competently engage in other legal transactions,
like wills or contracts.28 The Latin dementia, used for this kind
of temporary insanity, was later translated in English sources
as lunacy (on the theory that its changes were affected by the
moon).29
own house, your proper course will be, in our opinion, to summon the persons
who had the charge of him at the time and ascertain how they came to be so
remiss, and then pronounce upon the case of each separately, according as you
see anything to excuse or aggravate his negligence. The object of providing
keepers for lunatics [dementia] is to keep them not merely from doing harm to
themselves, but from bringing destruction upon others; and if this lastmentioned mischief should come to pass, it may well be set down to the
negligence of any who were not sufficiently assiduous in the discharge of their
office.” Id.
27. OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 25.
28. 5 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 277 (“The Emperor Justinian to Julian,
Praetorian Prefect[: ]”It sometimes happens that the affliction of insane men
remains continuous, and with others the attacks of disease are suspended, and
lucid intervals occur, and in this latter instance a great difference exists, for
some of the lucid intervals are short, and others are of long duration. In former
times the question arose whether the authority of the curator continued to
exist during the lucid intervals of insanity, when it temporarily ceased, and
when the disease returned, it was restored. Hence We, desiring to decide this
doubtful point, do hereby decree that, as when insane persons of this kind
recover their senses it is uncertain and impossible to determine whether this
will endure for a long or for a short period, and as the parties in question
frequently remain on the border line of insanity and health, and after they
continue for a considerable time in this condition, the lunacy seems in some
cases to be removed, We decree that the appointment of the curator shall not
be considered as ended, but to exist as long as the insane person lives, for
generally a disease of this kind is incurable; and We also decree that, during
their perfectly lucid intervals, the curator shall not exercise his authority, and
that the demented person, while he is temporarily in possession of his senses,
can enter upon an estate and do everything else which sane men are competent
to do”).
29. GEORGE WHITLEY ABRAHAM, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LUNACY IN
IRELAND: TOGETHER WITH A COMPENDIUM 31 (1886) (stating “[t]he idea of a
periodic insanity recurring at the changes of the moon, or in some way
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English law kept this distinction between temporary
possession (demens or lunacy) and permanent debility (furiosus)
as well as its legal implications, though early decisions are often
laconic and leave these matters to the King’s mercy.30 Through
1300, judges referred the insane to the King’s mercy without
further comment.31 In John Brydall’s 1700 treatise, he traces
influenced by them, was familiar to the ancients . . . and while the cases of such
insanity brought under the observation of actual experience may not be so
numerous or so typical as to mark them off into a well-defined class, there can
be no question that insanity of at least a seemingly intermittent character is
developed or quickened in individual patients at seasons corresponding with
the changes of the moon”). While Roman law does not suggest a “command of
God” defense, according to Katherine Watson, medieval canon law accepted
three, rather than two, versions of insanity, including a volitional component:
“[A]s a defect of knowledge (the individual did not know what he was doing);
as an instant compulsion (the individual was compelled or forced by some
inexplicable necessity); and as a defect of rational capacity (the individual was
not capable of reason because of intellectual impairment). All three categories
implied, to a greater or lesser extent, a lack of free will . . . [with] no capacity
to sin. . .According to canon law ‘affliction should not be heaped upon the
afflicted.’” KATHERINE WATSON, FORENSIC MEDICINE IN WESTERN SOCIETY: A
HISTORY 73–74 (Routledge 2010).
30. Apparently other scholars do not think this is so clear, see Crotty,
infra note 33, but it looks as though Justinian uses the terms furiosus and
demens pretty carefully to distinguish total (furor) from intermittent (demens)
loss of understanding, and distinguishes both from infancy and intellectual
disability. The distinction certainly makes sense, given that the most common
forms of mental illness at the time were likely to be dementia (in the modern
sense) or rabidity, both of which would worsen and result in a total deprivation
of mind, and epilepsy, which would come and go. Certainly furiosus would be
descriptive of symptoms of rabidity and demens of symptoms of epilepsy.
However, dementia was also used later as a generic term, with furor and
lunacy as more specific terms. See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 26 (stating
“[t]he classification adopted by Chief Justice Hale is not very dissimilar . . . .
Using dementia as one of the equivalents of insanity . . . he divides it into—1.
Idiocy . . . 2. Dementia accidentalis vel adventitia, which is (i.) quoad hoc vel
illud, or (ii.) total; and again, is (i.) permanent or fixed, when it is called
phrenesis, or (ii.) interpolated, and by certain periods or vicissitudes, when it
is called lunacy; and finally, is (i.) more dangerous and pernicious, commonly
called furor, rabies, mania; or (ii.) less so, such as is deep delirium, stupor. 3.
Dementia affectata, namely, drunkenness”).
31. See, e.g., 1 THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY 66–67 (Trinity
Term 1212) (stating “the king is to be consulted about an insane man who is
in prison because in his madness he confesses himself a thief, while really he
is not guilty”); id. at 119 (stating that “Richard of Brent, son of Adam Thurbern,
accused of larceny, comes and defends all of it and puts himself upon the
country. And the twelve jurors . . . say that they do not suspect him, save of a
fowl which he took in his madness at a time when he was lunatic.”); F REDERIC
WILLIAM MAITLAND ET AL., 5 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II: THE EYE OF KENT
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the continuities from Justinian through Bracton, Fleta, and
Coke, and divides insanity into intellectual disability from birth
(idiotus), temporary forms of insanity (demens or lunacy—like
epilepsy), and permanent forms of insanity developed later in
life (furor—like rabies).32 Hale and Hawkins continued this line
of thought, and Hale is likewise clear that insanity includes
being unable to distinguish between right and wrong, whether
permanently or temporarily.33
In 1724, Justice Tracy consulted these authorities in the
case of Edward Arnold, instructing the jury to acquit “if the

1313–14, at lxii (1996) (stating that “insane murderers were dealt with pretty
much as we deal with them now. A jury, to take an actual instance, finds that
one Geoffrey ‘tanquam demens et furiosus occidit predictum J. et non per
feloniam,’ and so [is not hanged but] must remain in prison during the King’s
pleasure.”); see also SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND,
2 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 490, 503 (Liberty
Fund, 1898) (stating that “[h]omicide by felony is frequently contrasted with
homicide by misadventure, homicide by self-defence and homicide committed
by one who is of unsound mind.”). Abraham also contains a helpful discussion
of the terms as they were used in English law texts, with similar distinctions
between demens and furiosus. ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 23–38.
32. JOHN BRYDALL, “NON COMPOS MENTIS, OR, THE LAW RELATING TO
NATURAL FOOLS, MAD-FOLKS, AND LUNATIC PERSONS INQUISITED AND EXPLAINED
FOR COMMON BENEFIT 6–7 (1700) (defining fool natural as “one that is wholly
deprived of his Reason and Understanding from his Birth,” also called by the
law an Idiot, so that he: “cannot number to Twenty; nor can tell what Age he
is of, nor knoweth who is his Father or Mother, nor is able to answer to any
such easie [sic] Question; whereby it may plainly appear that he hath not
reason to discern what is to his profit or damage, though it be notorious, nor is
apt to be informed or instructed by any other”). Brydall also defines madness
as a permanent condition of insanity, as today might be suffered in Alzheimer’s
or rabies, in which “one, that was of good and sound Memory, and by the
Visitation of God, through some Sickness, Grief, or other Accident, utterly
loseth his Memory, and Understanding; and so falls into some high, or low
degree of Fury or Madness.” Id. at 52 (referring to this category as furor men,
signaling a continuity with Roman law’s furiosus). Finally, Brydall defines
lunatick as “one, that hath sometime his Understanding, and sometime not”).
Id. at 94. He connects this category with the falling-sickness,—i.e., epilepsy—
and notes that “[t]he Roman Lawyers do distinguish every where, betwixt him
that is Furiosus, and him who is Demens.” Id. at 95. Furiosus is one who has
lost all understanding, but Demens is “not continually.” Id.
33. Homer D. Crotty, History of Insanity as a Defence to Crime in English
Criminal Law, 12 CALIF. L. REV. 105 (1924); Anthony Platt & Bernard L.
Diamond, The Origins of the “Right and Wrong” Test of Criminal Responsibility
and its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1227 (1966) (emphasizing the connection between moral
maturity and right/wrong insanity tests).
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defendant was under the visitation of God,34 and could not
distinguish between good and evil, and did not know what he
did.”35 Arnold was tried for the non-fatal shooting of Lord
Onslow, a defender of the Protestant religion, because he
believed Onslow was sending imps and voices to worry and
tempt him, as well as deprive him of rest.36 Arnold was
convicted, but pardoned through Onslow’s intercession.37
Justice Tracy is often credited with articulating the wild beast
test of insanity—that only someone who acts like a wild beast
may be acquitted. It is quite clear that this interpretation is
inaccurate—Tracy was merely referring to a line in Bracton and
earlier, in Justinian, which talks about the furiosus as having as
little understanding as a brutus or animal.38 Reading the jury

34. Blackstone also used “visitation of God” language in his discussion of
arraignments. At common law, a defendant who would not plead either guilty
or not guilty was subject to the torture of pressing—peine forte et dure.
However, Blackstone noted that an exception was made for those who could
not speak to enter their plea because they were under a “visitation of God”
rather than “mute of malice.” For those who could not speak a plea (either
because of mental or physical disability), a jury was empaneled to determine
whether their muteness was real or feigned. If feigned, they were convicted; if
real, they were tried as though they pled not guilty. The term “visitation by
God,” which appears in Blackstone and in Brydall, may appear to suggest that
insanity was considered a kind of deific possession akin to deific decree
situations. See 4 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 323
(1753) (stating “if [prisoner to be arraigned] says nothing, the court ought ex
officio to empanel a jury to inquire whether he stands obstinately mute, or
whether he be dumb ex visitation Dei. If the latter appears to be the case, the
judges of the court (who are to be of counsel for the prisoner, and to see that he
hath law and justice) shall proceed to the trial, and examine all points as if he
had pleaded not guilty”); see also id. at 23 (stating “idiots and lunatics are not
chargeable for their own acts”). This “visitation of God” language became a
kind of legal formula. “By Visitation of God” [ex Visitation Dei] was also a
formulaic phrase used extensively in coroner’s reports as the cause of death
when the cause of death was not accident or was unclear, embarrassing, or
could not be determined, well into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
though the phrase was disapproved by medical societies in the mid-1800s. See
SARA M. BUTLER, FORENSIC MEDICINE AND DEATH INVESTIGATION IN MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND 221–23 (Routledge 2016).
35. 16 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME 695 (T.B. Howell ed. 1816) [hereinafter A
COMPLETE COLLECTION]; see also ROBINSON, supra note 24, at 129–35.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See BRYDALL, supra note 32, at 78–80.
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charge as a whole, it is clear that Tracy is just repeating the
ancient distinction between furiosus and demens and
incorporating the requirement that the defendant be mature and
aware enough to distinguish right from wrong.39
From this brief history, one might conclude that the
categories of prophet, visionary, and insanity overlapped
completely, and thus the purported prophet was likewise
exonerated—any deific decree defense was just another branch
of the demens possession and/or temporary insanity defense.
Where Roman law prevailed, there was little discussion of deific
decree experiences as revelation rather than insanity.40 But
insofar as a Christian spiritual cosmology infused the law, the
question of possessed by whom complicated the story.41 While
Tracy characterized Arnold as suffering from “a visitation of
God,” the demens could also be considered “demon-possessed,”
and insanity was often considered to be the result of sin.42 When
medieval and early modern jurists now quoted the famous
language in Justinian that furor was its own punishment,43 they
39. See Platt & Diamond, supra note 33; see also Anthony M. Platt, The
Origins and Development of the “Wild Beast” Concept of Mental Illness and Its
Relation to Theories of Criminal Responsibility, 1 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 1
(1965) (arguing convincingly that the M’Naghten test was no innovation but
was consistent with prior law and practice, whereas the “wild beast” test
resulted from distorted understandings of key texts).
40. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 421, 430 (Harv. Univ. Press, 1983) (both the
Assizes of Ariano, circa 1115, and the Liber Augustalis, circa 1231, had
exemptions from criminal liability for insanity.
41. H.C. ERIK MIDELFORT, A HISTORY OF MADNESS IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY
GERMANY 190 (1999) (pointing out that canon law modified Roman law by
explicitly recognizing a volitional insanity defense when a defendant “was
impelled or forced by some inexplicable necessity,” consonant with the
Church’s emphasis on intentionality in defining sin, as well as with its
acknowledgment of the possibility of demonic possession). A nineteenthcentury English experiment with a similar “irresistible impulse” volitional test
was short-lived. Crotty, supra note 33, at 119.
42. ROBINSON, supra note 24, at 61–66, 71–84, 117–21 (tracing the rise
and fall of ideas of “possession” in medieval and early modern insanity law as
Roman legal ideas encountered Christian cosmology); see also MIDELFORT,
supra note 41, at 182–84 (recounting the 1590 trial of Conrad Herman, who
killed his wife because he believed her to be a witch, in which the jurists
applied the Roman law of insanity, but “were also troubled by the likelihood
(as it seemed to them) that [the defendant] was only pretending to be mad and
had actually given in to the suggestions of the evil spirit”).
43. See supra note 30, translated as “his insanity itself is punishment
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heard in it the connotations of Matthew in which Jesus casts out
demons, and Hosea 9:7 (King James): “the days of visitation are
come, the days of recompence are come: Israel shall know it: the
prophet is a fool, the spiritual man is mad, for the multitude of
thine iniquity, and the great hatred.”44 Insanity itself was its
own punishment, i.e., a divine punishment for sin.
The concern for both Church and nascent State was not
whether demonic possession was a real phenomenon (for well
into the eighteenth century, if not beyond, the reality of demonic
possession was never in doubt), but rather whether the demens
was a charlatan (in which case confession and punishment for
heresy or deception was required), suffering from a visitation of
God (in which case care, compassion, and awe were the proper
response), suffering a possession by demons (in which case
exorcism was required), or had welcomed demons in through sin
and was therefore a witch, heretic, or sorcerer (requiring
confession and death).45 Categories were so contested that in the
enough.” More than one thousand years later, Blackstone quotes the phrase
in his own discussion of insanity in English law: “‘[F]uriosus furore solum
punitur’ [‘madness alone punishes a madman’]. In criminal cases therefore
idiots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed when
under these incapacities: no, not even for treason itself.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND, ch. 2 (2014) (ebook). Note how the
phrase subtly changes in meaning from, “no need to punish someone so
afflicted,” to “insanity is punishment.”
44. Anthony Ossa-Richardon, Possession or Insanity? Two Views from the
Victorian Lunatic Asylum, 74 J. HIST. IDEAS 553 (2013); Alexandra Walsham,
Frantick Hacket’: Prophecy, Sorcery, Insanity, and the Elizabethan Puritan
Movement, 41 HIST. J. 27, 59 (1998).
45.
NANCY CACIOLA, DISCERNING SPIRITS: DIVINE AND DEMONIC
POSSESSION IN THE MIDDLE AGES intro. (2003) (stating “[o]n the one hand, a
person encompassed by constant supernatural interventions might be defined
as a divinely inspired prophet or visionary, a mouthpiece of God. Yet it was
equally possible to categorize such an individual as a demoniac possessed of
unclean spirits, as a false saint puffed up with pride, or as a victim of demonic
delusion”); MIDELFORT, supra note 41, at 184–86 (describing case of a
“desperate Saxon mother” who took the lives of several of her children to
prevent them from starvation, though she had plenty of food. The legal faculty
at Wittenberg concluded she was not insane, but suffering from melancholy,
which was both a disease caused by “black bile” and a sin of despair. Her
mitigated punishment included exhortations from the gospel which “brought a
spirit of joy that could drive out the sad suggestions of the evil spirit.”); id. at
219 (quoting Paulo Zacchia, papal physician in 1621, “those are properly called
demoniacs who are driven into insanity from a melancholy weakness, which
the demons then use as if it were an instrument to possess them”); W ATSON,
supra note 29 at 73 (stating “[r]eligious beliefs made the issue of insanity and
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1400s, Margery Kempe, a visionary English evangelist, was
tried for heresy several times and wrote that she was often
suspected of demonic possession, in part because of her ability to
quote scripture verbatim.46
Debates over supernatural
visitation raged through the centuries and cut across Catholic
and Protestant boundaries, with each side often accusing the
other alternately of either superstition or atheism. All sides in
these religious disputes sought to develop clearer distinctions
among insanity, possession, prophecy, and witchcraft: “Doctors
provided medical diagnoses, demonologists held forth on the
scope of demonic agency, and inquisitors probed the workings of

diminished capacity more complicated than it had been in the ancient world,
and placed a new and unique hardship on insane defendants: they were at risk
of being thought to be demonically possessed. Although the insane could not be
considered guilty of a crime if they had not knowingly committed the offense,
any persons whose ravings led to a suspicion of demonic possession were
subject to the strongest penalties. The insanity defence could not therefore be
used in witchcraft trials before a growing understanding of melancholia and
delusion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries began to offer alternative
explanations for the phenomena associated with witches”); see also Renate
Blumenfeld-Kosinski, The Strange Case of Ermine de Reims (c. 1347–1396): A
Medieval Woman between Demons and Saints, 85 SPECULUM 321, 322 (2010)
(In the 14th Century: “[d]emons, rather than being agents of evil that tested
humans’ endurance and spiritual steadfastness or participants in some
learned magical ritual, became increasingly associated with . . . witchcraft. . .
. . At the same time, the idea of possession became . . . ‘a major hermeneutic
challenge’: who was in charge of ‘assigning meanings’ to spiritual
phenomena?”); Michael Heyd, The Reaction to Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth
Century: Towards an Integrative Approach, 53 J. MOD. HIST. 258 (1981);
Andrew Keitt, Religious Enthusiasm, the Spanish Inquisition, and the
Disenchantment of the World, 65 J. HIST. IDEAS 230 (2004); Anthony OssaRichardon, Possession or Insanity? Two Views from the Victorian Lunatic
Asylum, 74 J. HIST. IDEAS 553 (2013) (describing the conflicted position of
asylum chaplains in the nineteenth century, some of whom argued that there
was no distinction between “lunatics and demoniacs” and that both “maniacs
and lunatics” were “demoniacs”—note the linguistic continuity with Roman
law here); Olga A. Tsapina, The Image of the Quaker and Critique of
Enthusiasm in Early Modern Russia, 24 RUSSIAN HIST. 251, 252–56 (1997)
(Quakers’ position that one could communicate directly with God was
dangerous, destabilizing and heretical during Civil War, Interregnum, and
Restoration in England); Alexandra Walsham, Frantick Hacket’: Prophecy,
Sorcery, Insanity, and the Elizabethan Puritan Movement, 41 HIST. J. 27 (1998)
[hereinafter Frantick Hacket].
46. MARGERY KEMPE, THE BOOK OF MARGERY KEMPE in GENELLE GERTZ,
HERESY TRIALS AND ENGLISH WOMEN WRITERS, 1400–1670, at 69, 199 n.95
(Cambridge 2012) (stating “she must be either spiritually inspired or
demonically possessed to hold such scriptural knowledge”).
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God’s providential order.”47
Any tidy distinctions were also complicated by the fact that
particular types of mental illness were often attributed to
satanic influence. For example, melancholia, or depression, was
thought to be caused by “black humors” manipulated by demonic
forces.48 Hence, suicide—a mortal sin and capital crime—was
described in English formulaic indictments as “not having the
fear of God before [one’s] eyes but being moved and seduced by
the instigation of the Devil.”49 Suicides were punished both in
this world—by forfeiting all possessions to the Crown50—and in
the next—by receiving no sacred burial and perhaps losing the
opportunity to suffer their way out of Purgatory.
Statutes against sorcery, heresy, and witchcraft crossed
between temporal and church authority. While originally
ecclesiastical offenders, impenitent heretics were turned over to
the civil authorities for punishment and execution.51 In
47. Keitt, supra note 45, at 235; Owen Williams, Exorcising Madness in
Late Elizabethan England: The Seduction of Arthington and the Criminal
Culpability of Demoniacs, 47 J. BRIT STUD. 30, 43 (2008) (citing RITUALE
ROMANUM PAULI V. PONT. MAX, IUSSU EDITUM 249 (Venice 1663); STUART
CLARK, THINKING WITH DEMONS: THE IDEA OF WITCHRAFT IN EARLY MODERN
EUROPE (Oxford 1997)) (proposing that the Church was very concerned to
distinguish between the insane and the possessed); id. (citing D.P. WALKER,
UNCLEAN SPIRITS: POSSESSION AND EXORCISM IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND IN THE
LATE SIXTEENTH AND EARLY SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES (Univ. Pa. Press 2016)
(1981)) (proposing that the devil targeted for possession those suffering from
mental illnesses); id. at 43 (citing WALKER, supra, at 36) (supporting his view
from Origen, Chrysostom, Jerome, and Matthew 4 and 17 that “the devil
habitually uses the morbid effects of the moon on the humours, especially black
bile, in order to torment demoniacs”).
48. See MIDELFORT, supra note 41; Sena, supra note 25.
49. Indictment of Aaron Burr, FOUNDERS ONLINE, Oct. 23, 1804,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-26-02-0001-0281;
see
also Terence R. Murphy, “Woful Childe of Parents Rage”: Suicide of Children
and Adolescents in Early Modern England, 1507–1710, 17 SIXTEENTH CENT. J.
259, 264 (1986); Williams, supra note 47, at 44.
50. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 31.
51. Id. at 570–82. Even in the time of Edward I, jurisdiction was
somewhat unclear, with some authorities stating that inquiries about sorcery
are within the sheriff’s jurisdiction, while others claim “it is for the
ecclesiastical court to try such offenders” though the king “as a good marshal
of Christianity” might proceed “as he pleases.” The first statute against heresy
was passed about 1406, and Henry VIII, Elizabeth I, and James I passed others
against sorcery. However, Pollack and Maitland argue that executions of
heretics, sorcerers, and witches were rare until the Commonwealth, citing
evidence that only 15 were executed from the time of Henry VIII until 1644,
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sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, civil and
ecclesiastic jurisdictions clashed over how to understand the
phenomenon of demonic possession and who had authority to
treat (or exorcise) those possessed and punish those responsible
for the possession.52
To take one colorful example, in the 1590s, a man named
William Hacket roved through London declaring himself to be
“Jesus Christ, King of the Earth and Christendom” and calling
for the deposition of Queen Elizabeth I and the death of her
ministers.53 Hacket developed a large and embarrassing
following—especially among disgruntled Puritans—such that he
created political turmoil during a time of official, if tentative,
détente among Catholics, Puritans, and the Church of England.54
He was arrested and convicted for treason, hung, drawn, and
quartered, despite the fact that he maintained his divine mission
though in the 16 years of Puritan rule, there were 109 “condemned and hung.”
Id. at 582 n.503 (citing Francis Hutchinson, An Historical Essay Concerning
Witchcraft (1718)). These numbers apparently do not include the hundreds of
Protestants executed for heresy during the Marian period, nor the hundreds of
Catholics executed as traitors (rather than heretics) under Tudor rule for
adhering to the view that the Pope, not the English monarch, was head of the
Church. PETER MARSHALL, HERETICS AND BELIEVERS: A HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH REFORMATION (Yale Univ. Press, 2018).
52. Marcus Harmes, The Archbishop and the Lord Chief Justice:
Dispossessions and the Clash of Jurisdictions in Jacobean England, 3
PRETERNATURE: CRITICAL & HIST. STUDS. PRETERNATURAL 32 (2014) (discussing
cases of witchcraft and demonic possession in which both civil and church
authorities claimed, and fought over, jurisdiction to exorcise and to punish);
see also Frantick Hacket, supra note 45, Williams, supra note 47, at 38
(providing a provocative connection to 1) Cicero’s list of kinds of insanity —
”Furor, Dementia, Insania, Fatuitas, Stultitia, Lethargia, and Delirium,”—
translated as “violent madness, less violent madness, inconstancy of mind,
idiocy, simplicity, radical forgetfulness, and dotage” and 2) to Cosin’s response
to the Hacket case by using Cicero’s distinctions to prove Hacket was not
suffering from Furor or Dementia, but rather from Insania—a mere wandering
mind). Williams also says that Church of England representatives were
skeptical of demonic possession and exorcism, as it was associated with both
Catholic and Puritan fringe groups. Id. From 1400–1612, heresy trials in
England also bounced between ecclesiastical and royal courts, and relapsed
heretics could be executed by secular authorities (as Joan of Arc was). Heresy
itself, of course, depended upon which English monarch was in power, as
Protestants and Catholics were alternately orthodox and heterodox. GERTZ,
supra note 46, at 7–12.
53. CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC SERIES, OF THE REIGN OF
ELIZABETH, 1591–1594, at 75–76 (Mary Anne Everett Green ed. 1867).
54. Frantick Hacket, supra note 45.
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even unto the scaffold, in wandering diatribes against the
Queen.55 Hacket’s compatriot, Arthington, escaped conviction
for treason by publishing a tract arguing that Hacket had
demonically possessed him.56 Hacket’s death, Arthington said,
had released him from his possessed state.57 Historian Owen
Williams explains the complications in the politics of Hacket and
Arthington’s cases arose from overlapping jurisdictions of
ecclesiastical and legal authorities, the reluctance of Church of
England clergy to acknowledge either possession or exorcism
(because of their association with religious fringe groups, both
Puritan and Catholic), and their equal reluctance to relinquish
any traditional ecclesiastical authority. Later, English lawyers
struggled mightily—and unconvincingly—to prove that Hacket
was, in fact, sane and no injustice had been committed.
The provenance of an alleged deific decree would have been
acutely and centrally important even in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century adjudications. God, the Devil, witchcraft,
and mental illness were all at work—and difficult to distinguish.
Yet distinguishing between them was of the utmost importance.
II. Revelation and Reason in U.S. Courts
Today, of course, we believe that we think differently.
Medicine and science now understand insanity as a form of
disease, not a mode of spiritual communication or demonic
possession; yet, the problem of separating religious conviction
and prayer from disease has not disappeared. Courts still have
to decide what to do with defendants who disobey the law
because God told them to, and psychiatrists still have to decide
where delusion ends and religious belief begins.

55. Id.
56. Williams, supra note 47.
57. Id.
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A. Hearing from God Is Always a Symptom of Insanity
“Insanity is a belief not founded on evidence.”58

At one end of the spectrum is a legal response that
automatically counts all sincere claims of revelation as insanity.
As law is committed to reason and evidence as its metaphysics
of truth, this position is natural to law and often presumed by
commentators. As an example, consider the trial of Charles J.
Guiteau for the assassination of James A. Garfield.59 Guiteau
was convinced that he was divinely chosen to do great things,
and he expected that a rapid rise to distinction would be a sign
of his vocation.60 It soon became apparent that academic
distinction was not the destined path, and Guiteau left college. 61
Deciding that his greatness would appear in religious life, he
joined the Oneida colony where he first worshipped and, later,
excoriated its founder, Noyes, and then wrote his own book on
theology plagiarized from Noyes.62 When Guiteau was expelled
from Oneida and was not recognized as a prophet, he turned to
law and politics.63 He wrote a speech in favor of Garfield’s
candidacy for president, presenting it to a few small audiences.64
When Garfield unexpectedly won, Guiteau believed his true
vocation had been revealed and that his speech was responsible
58. Guiteau v. United States, 10 F. 161, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1882).
59. Id.
60. CANDICE MILLARD, DESTINY OF THE REPUBLIC: A TALE OF MADNESS,
MEDICINE AND THE MURDER OF A PRESIDENT (2011) (emphasizing in detail the
biographical parallels of Garfield and Guiteau: both were raised in poverty by
single parents, both narrowly escaped death and thought of themselves as
“saved” for a divine purpose; Guiteau expected fortune to favor him, but it
never did and Garfield, by contrast, had exactly the propitious meteoric rise to
fame that Guiteau vainly anticipated; both wrote of their divine mission and
“great expectations” with self-confidence; both shared expectations of divine
favor; Garfield had many qualities, including emotional intelligence, genuine
compassion, integrity, and willingness to work hard, that Guiteau’s sheer
narcissism lacked). The biography encourages the reader to ask whether, if
Guiteau’s vaunting ambitions had been rewarded with as much alacrity as
Garfield’s, would he have been the same, desperate, bitter, selfish creature.
Was only one of these men insane?
61. Id. at 48.
62. Id. at 50–53.
63. Id. at 57.
64. Id. at 57.
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for Garfield’s victory.65 Guiteau came to D.C. to claim his
reward, and he pestered Garfield’s cabinet members for
ambassadorships.66 When that avenue of distinction failed,
Guiteau finally became convinced that God was telling him to
kill Garfield in order to save the Republican Party and the
nation.67 On July 2, 1881, he shot Garfield twice from behind at
the train station, and Garfield died eleven weeks later of
infection.68 Guiteau claimed insanity, and he cursed and ranted
during much of the trial.69 Judge Cox’s summing up and
instruction to the jury struggled to articulate the proper legal
analysis of insanity:
There are cases in which a man’s mental faculties
generally seem to be in full vigor, but on some one
subject he seems to be deranged. He is possessed,
perhaps, with a belief which every one recognizes
as absurd, which he has not reasoned himself into,
and cannot be reasoned out of, which we call an
insane delusion, or he has, in addition, some
morbid propensity, seemingly in harsh discord
with the rest of his intellectual and moral
nature.70
A belief, says Judge Cox, “not founded on evidence,” is
insane.71 Judge Cox then strives to distinguish normal religious
belief from delusion, but his jury charge makes it clear that even
widely accepted cases of religious inspiration cannot be
understood as “sanity” under the law’s definition of reason and
truth:
A great many Christians believe, not only that
events generally are providentially ordered, but
that they themselves receive special providential
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
MILLARD, supra note 60, at 94–96, 106–08.
Id. at 113–15.
Id. at 131–32, 228–29.
Id. at 239–42.
Guiteau, 10 F. at 166 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 171.
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guidance and illumination in reference to both
their inward thoughts and outward actions, and,
in an undefined sense, are inspired to pursue a
certain course of action; but this is a mere sane
belief, whether well or ill founded. On the other
hand, if you were satisfied that a man sincerely,
though insanely, believed that, like Saul of
Tarsus, on his way to Damascus, he had been
smitten to the earth, had seen a great light
shining around him, had heard a voice from
heaven, warning and commanding him, and that
thenceforth, in reversal of his whole previous
moral bent and mental convictions, he had acted
upon this supposed revelation, you would have
before you a case of imaginary inspiration
amounting to an insane delusion.72
While Judge Cox struggles to limit religious conviction to
modest irrationalities, it is hard to avoid the conclusion in these
passages that St. Paul would be considered, under this analysis,
legally insane, as was Abraham, who “insist[ed] that the
Almighty has appeared to him and commanded him to sacrifice
his child.”73 Only religious beliefs that are susceptible to
revision in light of reason are, on the logic of this view,
undoubtedly sane.
Cox’s instructions to the jury underscored reasons to doubt
Guiteau’s claim of divine command, precisely because it was not
completely irrational: “And so, in like manner, I say, a man
m[a]y reason himself into a conviction of the expediency and
patriotic character of political assassination, but to allow him to
find shelter from punishment behind that belief, as an insane
delusion, would be simply monstrous.”74 After weeks of trial, the
jury convicted the defendant in less than an hour.75
Guiteau’s trial demonstrates one approach to law and
revelation: Irrational revelations are ipso facto insanity. A
similar, but subtler, approach is for law to retreat into a position
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 177.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 175.
MILLARD, supra note 60, at 241.
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of extreme positivism and moral relativism, eliding both
religious and ethical beliefs as subjective and unprovable and,
therefore, irrelevant to law. While not explicitly calling religious
belief insane, this position denies claims to truth of both religion
and ethics and tries to maintain a clear separation between the
objective and subjective realms.
In People v. Serravo, for example, the Defendant claimed
that he should be acquitted on grounds of insanity because,
while he knew it was against the law to stab his wife in the back,
God had told him to do it.76 The doctrinal issue on appeal was
whether the M’Naghten test should define insanity as being
unable to know the illegal from the legal, in which case Serravo
was sane, rather than the wrong from the right, in which case
he might be considered insane.77 The majority upheld the
relevance of the right/wrong formulation, but Justice Vollack’s
dissent argued that “[u]ntil a moral standard becomes law it is
an unreliable test for insanity.”78 Only delusions that affect a
person’s ability to understand “what society has fixed and
established as law”79 should be relevant, Vollack argued. The
majority “creates an exception by incorporating a subjective
standard—a person’s religious inclinations and beliefs—into
[Colorado’s definition of insanity.] In Colorado, neither the
General Assembly nor this court has accepted subjective tests to
determine criminal responsibility.”80 Vollack’s position, like
Cox’s, demonstrates law’s difficulty in thinking of religious
convictions as having any connection with truth. At best, they
are unfounded opinions; at worst, they are insane delusions.
However, like other instances of subjectivity, for Vollack,
religious convictions amount to legal insanity only in cases in
which they obscure one’s knowledge of the law on the books.
A third approach that also illustrates a kind of presumption
of insanity for religion would deny that deific decree cases are
different in kind from any other command delusion. While these
commentators often favor broadening the legal insanity defense,
76.
77.
78.
1979)).
79.
80.

823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992).
Id.
Id. at 147 (quoting State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Iowa
Id.
Id. at 148.
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rather than narrowing it, and do not usually paint morality as
fatally subjective, they see no difference between a command
from God and a command from dog.81 Christopher Hawthorne,
for example, argued that deific decree was a “pseudo-doctrine,”
for if God’s commands were considered to be different than other
commands, the law would be establishing religion, and if God’s
commands were no different from others, then judges were
either sneaking in a volitional element to the insanity defense
despite legislative disapproval of “irresistible impulse”
formulations, or they were at risk of establishing a cultural
defense for all religious and ethical non-conformists, like the
infamous Rodney Crenshaw, who killed his allegedly unfaithful
wife because of his “Moscovite” beliefs.82 Rabia Belt’s analysis is
similar, though she argues for broadening, rather than
narrowing, the insanity defense and for recognizing that
presuppositions about religion affect not only the law but
psychiatry as well.83
So, deific decree doctrine seems to exemplify law’s
discomfort with revelation. Grant Morris and Ansar Haroun
make just this point:
The deific decree doctrine assumes that when the
defendant heard the voice of God commanding
81. See Hawthorne, supra note 12, at 1759 n.19–20 (comparing “Son of
Sam” killer David Berkowitz, who heard commands in the barking of a
neighbor’s dog).
82. Id. at 1771–75, 1800–09; see also State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488
(Wash. 1983). The “Moscovite religion” Crenshaw purports to follow in this
case is unclear. There is a controversial New-Calvinist religious group in
Moscow, Idaho near the Washington state border known as “Muscovite” that
has strong anti-feminist and anti-divorce rules and has been active since about
1977. There is no apparent evidence that Crenshaw was a member of that sect.
However, the Church’s ideology would be somewhat consistent with his
assertion at trial that adultery was a capital sin. See Doug Wilson, The Death
Penalty as Our Only Hope, BLOG & MABLOG: THEOLOGY THAT BITES BACK (Sept.
27, 2017), https://dougwils.com/books-and-culture/s7-engaging-the-culture/dea
th-penalty-hope.html (arguing that the death penalty is in principle religiously
justified for sodomy and sexual sins); see also Peter J. Jankowski et al.,
Religious Beliefs and Domestic Violence Myths, 10 PSYCHOL. RELIGION &
SPIRITUALITY 386 (2018) (analyzing a study of 238 students from a Protestant
evangelical seminary that found positive association between New-Calvinist
beliefs and domestic violence acceptance).
83. Belt, supra note 8.
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him or her to kill, the defendant was experiencing
a delusion—that he or she was not experiencing a
true religious revelation. The critics of the deific
decree doctrine also make the same assumption.
But is that assumption warranted?84
They warn that preferring atheism to theism may violate
the Establishment Clause by treating religious convictions less
favorably than non-religious convictions.85 So, if law treats
alleged commands of God as ipso facto delusional, there is no
way to avoid denigrating religion, whether the law acquits only
those commanded by God, or acquits all those with command
hallucinations.
B. God Is Reason (God Is Irrelevant)
Even the Holy One of the Gospel must first be
compared with our ideal of moral perfection before he
is recognized as one.86

One obvious way to address the conflict between law and
revelation without presuming religion to be a form of insanity is
to identify the two: God is reason(able). Aquinas, for example,
sought to provide an understanding of God that would enable an
articulation of natural law that would necessarily accord with
divine law.87 William of Ockham, however, thought that placing
rational limits on God’s power was impious, as well as overestimating human ability to know God through reason.88 This

12.

84. Morris & Haroun, supra note 12, at 1019; see also Demko, supra note

85. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
86. IMMANUEL KANT, RETHINKING THE WESTERN TRADITION: GROUNDWORK
FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 25 (Allen W. Wood, ed. & trans., Yale Univ.
Press 2002) [hereinafter GROUNDWORK].
87. See C. STEPHEN EVANS, FAITH BEYOND REASON: A KIERKEGAARDIAN
ACCOUNT 60 (1998)(stating “[i]t cannot be overemphasised [sic] that the
function of reason in Aquinas’ view is to confirm that a purported revelation
really is from God”).
88. See William of Ockham (Occam, c. 1280—c. 1349), INTERNET ENCYC.
PHILOSOPHY 7a, https://www.iep.utm.edu/ockham/ (“God does not conform to
an independently existing standard of goodness; rather, God himself is the
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kind of extreme humility can lead to either unbreachable conflict
between reason and revelation89 or a kind of irrelevance of
religion to legal affairs. As Julie Cooper explains:
While
Augustinians
insist
that
divine
omnipotence
entails
human
impotence,
Ockhamists contend that God is so powerful, and
so unfathomable, that humans are left no choice
but to manage their own affairs, because God is
unavailable for consultation. (As Hobbes develops
this line of argument, submitting political life to
divine direction betrays sinful pride, because it
presumes that humans can know God.)90
Kant’s Religion with the Limits of Reason Alone also takes
on Aquinas’s task of unifying reason and revelation, but tries to
accommodate the Ockhamist proviso that knowledge of God is
beyond human capacity, while avoiding the real politik
pessimism that seems to pervade Hobbes. From the doctrine of
original sin, to salvation through grace, to the Trinity, Kant
systematically reinterprets Christian doctrine philosophically,
and Biblical narrative allegorically, to accord with his reasonbased ethical theory. Important to Kant’s resolution of the
conflicts is a kind of humility about religious truth. For example,
we need not assert that the Church is wrong about grace being
necessary to salvation, we need only say that, if God is actually
responsible for our good actions, we never know it and must
assume nonetheless that striving to be good is within our power:
Granted that some supernatural cooperation may
be necessary to his becoming good, or to his
becoming better, yet, whether this cooperation
consists merely in the abatement of hindrances or
indeed in positive assistance, man must first
make himself worthy to receive it, and must lay
hold of this aid (which is no small matter)—that
standard of goodness”).
89. See infra pt. II(C).
90. JULIE E. COOPER, SECULAR POWERS: HUMILITY
THOUGHT 64 (2013).

IN

MODERN POLITICAL
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is, he must adopt this positive increase of power
into his maxim, for only thus can good be imputed
to him and he be known as a good man . . . . For
despite the fall, the injunction that we ought to
become better men resounds unabatedly in our
souls; hence this must be within our power, even
though what we are able to do is in itself
inadequate and though we thereby only render
ourselves susceptible of higher, and for us
inscrutable assistance.91
However, Kant’s humility about revelation makes
revelation irrelevant, as he acknowledges.92 For example:
[I]n the end religion will gradually be freed from
all empirical determining grounds . . . . The
leading-string of holy tradition with its
appendages of statutes and observances, which in
its time did good service, becomes bit by bit
dispensable, yea, finally, when man enters upon
his adolescence, it becomes a fetter.93
If God is reason, at least so far as we can know, then reason
alone is all we really need. If God is reason(able), from the point
of view of the deific decree exception, the conflict between reason
and revelation is eliminated, because God could never command
anything that was not right. Therefore, if one knows the
difference between right and wrong according to reason, a
command delusion is no excuse, for knowing the difference
between right and wrong is the very ground of knowing God:
“even the Holy One of the Gospel must first be compared with
our ideal of moral perfection before he is recognized as one.”94
91. KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE 40–41 (Greene
& Hudson trans., Harper & Row 1960) (1934) [hereinafter R ELIGION].
92. Cf. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS 23 (Richard Polt
trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1997) (1889) (stating “[t]he true world—unattainable?
In any case, unattained. And if it is unattained, it is also unknown. And hence
it is not consoling, redeeming or obligating either; to what could something
unknown obligate us?”).
93. RELIGION, supra note 91, at 121.
94. GROUNDWORK, supra note 86, at 25.
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One sees the effort to eliminate the conflict between reason
and revelation in both legal and religious materials. For
example, in Archie v. State, a “floridly psychotic” Teresa Archie
shot her daughter because she thought her daughter was
consorting with Satan (she was reading a Stephen King novel),
and God told her to do so.95 Archie was convicted by a jury on
standard M’Naghten instructions.96 The prosecutor emphasized
the testimony of a psychiatrist which stated:
She was in a great deal of anguish and
internal anxiety and turmoil. God was telling
her in her delusion to kill her daughter, but God
also has told her and all of us Thou Shalt Not
Kill. So, we are getting conflicting instructions
here from God in Teresa’s mind.97
Archie testified that she asked for forgiveness both before
and after she shot her daughter, and also that she ran to the
road shouting “I done your Will Lord.”98 The Prosecutor argued
that Archie would not have asked for forgiveness if she did not
know that she had done wrong.99 Essentially, because Archie
knew right from wrong, and she knew that God was good, her
jury found that she should have concluded that God would not
have commanded her to kill her daughter.100 Her conviction was
upheld on appeal, with the appellate judge stating that:
[I]t would appear that the jury could have
reasonably questioned whether Archie really
believed that God had directed her to commit the
act, given the logical assumption that she would
not have needed forgiveness, because acting on a
directive from God would not constitute a sin or a
moral wrong. The jury could have also reasonably
questioned whether Archie had asked for
95. 875 So. 2d 336, 341 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
96. Id. at 346.
97. Id. at 342 n.3 (quoting Dr. Dixon).
98. Id. at 346 (citation omitted).
99. See generally id.
100. Id.
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forgiveness because she could have been
uncertain as to her interpretation of God’s will.
This is a particularly tragic and troubling case.
The record indicates that Archie was
unquestionably suffering from a severe mental
illness when she killed her daughter . . . .
However, the law in Alabama is clear. Archie had
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she
was unable to appreciate the nature and quality
or wrongfulness of her acts. Resolution of any
conflicts in the evidence is, of course, for the
jury.101
Grant Morris and Ansar Haroun point out that the problem
of distinguishing between religion and delusion does not
disappear when one treats religious delusion as a medical
issue.102
While the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”)
struggles to define religious delusions without presuming that
idiosyncratic religious beliefs are insane, in practice
psychiatrists are more likely to believe that a religious belief is
delusional if the divinity is acting unconventionally. In a study
of how psychiatrists determined whether a religious belief was
delusional:
Three variations of each core vignette were
written to reflect conventional, less conventional,
and unconventional practices. For example, in
one core vignette that focused on the dimension of
what is communicated, individuals heard the
voice of God telling them to: (1) baptize their
newborn child—a conventional religious practice,
(2) prepare a worship service—a less conventional
religious practice, or (3) sacrifice their child—an
unconventional religious practice. The vignettes
were tested on sixty-seven mental health
practitioners of varying professional backgrounds,
101. Archie, 875 So. 2d at 343–44.
102. Morris & Haroun, supra note 12.
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experience, and religious affiliation. The results
were not surprising. For every vignette tested,
the conventional response was rated significantly
more religiously authentic and significantly less
pathological than the less conventional response.
For every vignette tested, the less conventional
response was rated significantly more religiously
authentic and significantly less pathological than
the unconventional response . . . . Clinicians seem
to be applying a “Good God” theory to measure the
authenticity of a religious belief.103
Religious communities often make the same assumption,
accepting personal revelation as genuine only when it stays
within the limits of the ethical, but rejecting revelations as
insane or insincere when they diverge from the identification of
God with reason. Luhrmann reports that, when she asked
members of the evangelical Vineyard church about how they
determined whether an inner voice came from God, they replied:
[The first test was whether the thought sounded
like your own.] The second test was whether it
was the kind of thing that God would say or
imply. This was often articulated as making sure
that what you thought God had said did not
contradict God’s word in the Bible. This caution
was explicitly expressed in all the written
material and nearly every casual conversation on
the topic. Dialogue with God, for instance, states
clearly (and repeatedly) that “if the revelation
violates either the letter of the Word or the spirit
of the Word, it is to be rejected immediately.”
God is a loving God; a revelation that tells you to
hurt yourself or someone else, people said, came
from something other than God. “You need
discernment,” the pastor said. “There’s a letter
written from Paul when he says, ‘Don’t put out
the fires of the spirit but test everything, and
103. Id. at 1038–39.
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hold on to what is good.’ We don’t expect that God
would want someone to cut themselves, or tell
them to jump off a bridge. That is not God.”
Notice that this would not apply to Abraham and
Isaac or the other points in the Hebrew Bible
when God acts, as the biblical scholar Jack Miles
puts it when writing about the Book of Job, like
a fiend. When people talked about making sure
that what you heard did not contradict the Bible,
they really meant that it should be in keeping
with the understanding of God’s character as
taught within this church:
unconditionally
loving, eternally forgiving. The God at the
Vineyard was not a fiend.104
Not all religious traditions, nor all legal cases, however,
identify reason and God, as the next section makes clear.
C. God Trumps Reason
Now divine Testimony or Revelation requires these
following Credentials:
1. That the propositions or doctrines revealed by not
inconsistent with reason; for intelligent creatures can
never be bound to believe real inconsistencies. Therefore
we are sure the popish doctrine of transubstantiation is
not a matter of divine revelation, because it is contrary
to all our senses and our reason, even in their proper
exercises.
God can dictate nothing but what is worthy of
himself, and agreeable to his own nature and divine
perfections. Now many of these perfections are
discoverable by the light of reason, and whatever is
inconsistent with these perfections, cannot be a divine
revelation.
But let it be noted, that in matters of practice
toward our fellow-creatures, God may command us to
act in a manner contrary to what reason would direct
104. LUHRMANN, supra note 7, at 64–65 (footnote omitted).
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antecedent to that command. So Abraham was
commanded to offer up his son a sacrifice: the Israelites
were ordered to borrow of the Egyptians without paying
them, and to plunder and slay the inhabitants of
Canaan: because God has a sovereign right to all things,
and can with equity dispossess his creatures of life, and
every thing which he has given them, and especially
such sinful creatures as mankind; and he can appoint
whom he pleases to be the instruments of this just
dispossession or deprivation. So that these divine
commands are not really inconsistent with right reason;
for whatsoever is so, cannot be believed where that
inconsistency appears.105

The assumption that God will always do what humans
imagine to be good and/or in accordance with positive law is
neither a necessary feature of all belief systems nor of all
religious narratives. Presuming that religion will dovetail with
law may, therefore, be yet another kind of Establishment Clause
violation.
As I pointed out at the beginning, even in
Christianity, the most mainstream of United States religions,
there are many stories of God commanding death and
destruction that we would certainly find unlawful, unethical,
and unreasonable.106 Does God’s command trump law, even
when it seems wrong?
Arguably, the original deific decree doctrine assumed just
that.
Chief Justice Shaw, in Commonwealth v. Rogers,
undertook to explain the doctrine of insanity in a case involving
a prisoner who had killed a prison warden whom the prisoner
believed was going to kill him.107 Shaw explains in his jury
charge that ‘partial insanity’ may operate in one of two modes:

105. ISAAC WATTS, LOGIC; OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON, IN THE ENQUIRY
AFTER TRUTH; WITH A VARIETY OF RULES TO GUARD AGAINST ERROR IN THE
AFFAIRS OF RELIGION AND HUMAN LIFE, AS WELL AS IN THE SCIENCES 235 (1724)
(emphasis added).
106. See Numbers 21:2-3; Deuteronomy 20:17; Joshua 6:17, 21
(commanding the extermination of Jericho’s inhabitants and those of other
Canaanite cities). Job and Abraham/Isaac are other examples—though these
have happier endings.
107. 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500 (1844).
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Either the delusion is such that the person under
its influence has a real and firm belief of some
fact, not true in itself, but which, if it were true,
would excuse his act: As where the belief is, that
the party killed had an immediate design upon his
life, and under that belief the insane man kills in
supposed self defence. A common instance is
where he fully believes that the act he is doing is
done by the immediate command of God, and he
acts under the delusive but sincere belief that
what he is doing is by the command of a superior
power, which supersedes all human laws, and the
laws of nature. [Or] 2. . . . [T]hat the known
tendency of that diseased state of the mind is to
break out into sudden paroxysms of violence . . .
towards friend or foe indiscriminately . . .
overborne memory and reason . . . not of a mind
capable of choosing . . . result of uncontrollable
impulse, and not of a person acted upon by
motives, and governed by the will.108
Shaw states that a command of God, if true, “supersedes all
human laws, and the laws of nature” and, therefore, like a
reasonable belief that one is being attacked, a deific decree “if it
were true” would justify the crime.109 This account of insanity
does not assume that hearing God is itself insanity, or that God
would never order a criminal act. Rather, like Ockham, Calvin,
or the Isaac Watts quotation at the beginning of this section,
Shaw asserts the possibility of a God who might demand
murder. Contrary to Kant, God determines good, not the other
way around.110
So, on this model, if the divine command were real, the
slayer would be justified. If the slayer is sincere but reasonably
108. Id. at 503 (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Drawing on Aquinas and Ockham’s dispute, there is a vast literature
in theology on the virtues of ascribing to a “divine command theory” of ethics,
or a natural law theory of ethics. See, e.g., Wes Morriston, What if God
Commanded Something Terrible?: A Worry for Divine-Command Meta-Ethics,
45 RELIGIOUS STUD. 249 (2009); Jean Porter, Divine Commands, Natural Law,
and the Authority of God, 34 J. SOC’Y CHRISTIAN ETHICS 3 (2014).
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mistaken about the divine command, the slayer is excused.
Presumably, if the slayer is sincere but mistaken and did not
follow proper protocols for discernment (see below), the slayer’s
sentence might be mitigated because of his good faith, but
unreasonable, mistake of fact. The question of insanity is barely
relevant, except to demonstrate that his mistake was sincere
and/or not a product of negligent discernment.
Shaw’s account was most likely relying on the language of
Hale,111 and on the acquittal of James Hadfield in England in
1800.112 Hadfield had attacked his own child and then tried to
kill George III because of his belief that heaven had commanded
that he kill himself and his child in order to save the world. 113
Because suicide was against divine law, Hadfield attacked the
king as a way to ensure his own death. Hadfield had previously
suffered from multiple gruesome head and neck injuries from his
military service with the Duke of York—providing the jury with
graphic and rare physical evidence of his mental illness.
Robinson reports that:
Hadfield fostered the conclusion that actions
arising from morbid delusion should be judged
according to what the law would require or permit
were the contents of the delusion true. If, indeed,
James Hadfield had been commanded by God to
rid the world of himself but not by taking his own
life, and if he sought to obey this [command by
seeking to have the King’s defenders kill him], no
English court would have found him guilty of a
crime.114

111. Hale is also the source of Cardozo’s hypothetical about a woman
killing her child. See ROBINSON, supra note 24, at 120; 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 29 (1800).
112. A COMPLETE COLLECTION, supra note 35, at 1281; see also ROBINSON,
supra note 24, at 141–54.
113. A COMPLETE COLLECTION, supra note 35.
114. ROBINSON, supra note 24, at 141–54; see also Garvey, supra note 12,
at 153 (arguing that this mode of analyzing insanity as delusion presents
judges and juries with the impossible task of applying legal rules—like
necessity or self-defense—to a crazy subjective world).
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Shaw’s position in Rogers imagines the possibility of law
and reason superseded by religious command. If so, then the
deific decree exception should apply even when there is no sign
of insanity. Of course, presuming that a deific decree would
trump the positive law would seem to be yet another clear
violation of the Establishment Clause, as it substitutes a
religious command for state law. Jurisdictions that have
adopted the right/wrong M’Naghten test have faced this
problem, though most reach for some way to avoid it, either by
adding a volitional component or by moving toward the
legal/illegal version of the instruction.115
For example, in State v. Turgeon, the case described in the
introduction, Christopher Turgeon and Blaine Applin were
members of a Bible ministry called Gatekeepers.116 Turgeon
seemed in every respect sane, and “claims that he is able to
predict events and that he regularly receive[d] messages from
God.”117 In 1996, Turgeon received a message that “it was time
to declare war against the government” and the Gatekeepers
began robbing and defrauding businesses that they perceived to
be sinful, and exacting judgment on those who left their group. 118
According to Turgeon’s testimony, one of these former members,
Dan Jess, threatened to expose Turgeon as a false prophet and
stop his plan to kill abortion doctors, so God told Turgeon to kill
Dan.119 Turgeon’s instruction was confirmed by Applin’s own
conversations with God, so Turgeon and Applin drove from
California to Washington to shoot Dan.120 They allegedly gave
God a final chance to dissuade them, if He caused an unplanned
stop on the way.121 Instead, Turgeon and Applin saw seven
rainbows, which they interpreted as a confirmation of their
mission.122 Applin, who believed he was God’s “chosen vessel,”
shot Dan as he answered his door.123
115. See, e.g., People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992); State v.
Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983).
116. No. 49535-6-I, 2004 WL 555278 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2004).
117. Id. at *1.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *1, *4.
120. Id. at *1.
121. Id.
122. Turgeon, 2004 WL 555278, at *1.
123. State v. Applin, 67 P.3d 1152, 1156 (2003).
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Two reasons this case is so disturbing are that, first, divine
revelation is the only sign of unusual cognition in this case (at
least, as the facts are stated by the appellate court), and, second,
the two murderers, per their testimony, seemed to be following
traditional religious doctrines for evaluating their divine
communications, known as doctrines of “discernment.”
According to these doctrines, signs that you have discerned
God’s will correctly include: being filled with hope and passion
after being given an instruction (this is a sign of God’s approval);
coincidence with revelations to others (this is a sign of God’s
confirmation); asking God to close doors in order to make it clear
if you are on the wrong path, but no obstacles appear; and feeling
at peace with your actions.124 According to the testimony in this
124. For more detailed discussion, see infra pt. II(C)(1)(a). Catholic,
Protestant, and evangelical groups all give roughly similar advice. See Mark
Bentz, Ignatian Discernment of Spirits, https://12473.sites.ecatholic.com/docu
ments/2017/1/Discernment%20of%20Spirits%20Talk.pdf (last visited Apr. 17,
2019); Daniel D. Meyer, Sailing by the Light: How Do I Know Which Way to
Go? (1997) (on file with author) (advising that people look to: (1) scripture; (2)
contemplation; (3) respected peers; and (4) providential circumstances). But
see LUHRMANN, supra note 7, at 64, 70, 143 (finding a lot of hesitation and
disagreement, even among those who believe they communicate with God
directly and regularly: “[A] revelation that tells you to hurt yourself or someone
else, people said, came from something other than God.” “For all the practice,
hearing God’s voice remains a complicated discrimination task for these
congregants.” “‘I think the safest position to be in is that God doesn’t speak to
people outside the Bible,’ he told me. ‘I mean people say, “God’s telling me to
go shoot an abortion doctor.” It’s craziness. Maybe it’s a spiritual experience;
maybe it’s a lot of caffeine’”). See also Simon Dein & Christopher C.H. Cook,
God Put a Thought Into My Mind: The Charismatic Christian Experience of
Receiving Communications from God, 18 MENTAL HEALTH, RELIGION &
CULTURE 97, 106–08 (2015) (noting that the mode of communication is also
understood by most evangelicals to differ—God puts thoughts in one’s mind,
which may be ignored (“in all instances, agency is maintained”), or at times
communicates out loud but without inciting fear or compulsion, whereas
schizophrenia involves hearing voices that issue commands; that in his study
communications from God were usually thoughts concerned with present,
mundane matters, provided reassurance, and people sought to confirm these
communications through scripture, or through the interrupting or alien nature
of the thought or feeling. Vicar of an evangelical church in England taught
these discernment practices: (1) congregant should consider whether the
purported communication was consistent with God’s “revealed character and
will” rather than from their own “minds and imaginations” or from “the
enemy.” (“Divine communication will never contradict scripture.”) (2) prophecy
is “necessarily incomplete” until Jesus returns, so it is “not always
authoritative, and needs to be tested,” (3) congregants should discuss
prophecies pertaining to “birth, marriage and death” with vicar before sharing
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case, Turgeon and Applin did all of these things: they
deliberated and checked their messages with each other; they
prayed and contemplated; and they gave God a chance to stop
them.125
Under the deific decree doctrine as Shaw states it, Turgeon
and Applin would be innocent, whether or not they were insane,
as long as they non-negligently and sincerely thought they were
following a deific decree that, if true, would exonerate them. The
jury, however, convicted them.126 The trial court’s instructions,
which were challenged on appeal, had required the Defendants
to show that their “free will” was destroyed by the deific decree—
importing a volitional test into the M’Naghten instruction.127
The Appellate Court upheld the conviction, but it did so by
manipulating its way to a determination that the trial court’s
addition of the instructional requirement of no free will was not
really a volitional transformation of the right/wrong doctrine,
but could instead be understood as requiring only the
destruction of “defendant’s free will to distinguish right from
wrong.”128 Yet, if the usual M’Naghten instruction had been
given—that Defendant should be acquitted if he did not know
right from wrong—then the case presents the real consequences
of accepting, as Shaw did, that a command of God could overturn
the law. Turgeon and Applin should be acquitted, if indeed God
commanded them or if their belief that God did so was nonnegligent and in good faith, or their sentence should be
mitigated if their belief was sincere but negligent. The insanity
them, so he could pray for confirmation, since “these are often wrong and could
do considerable harm to those involved”); Rodney Stark, A Taxonomy of
Religious Experience, 5 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 97 (1965) (discussing taxonomy
of religious experiences ranging from confirmatory feelings of awe or reverence
or conviction, responsive experiences of divine presence or attention, ecstatic
experiences of the above along with states of bodily excitement, like shaking,
to revelational experiences of visions and signs, which are the rarest); Rodeny
Stark, A Theory of Revelations, 38 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 287 (1999)
(suggesting revelatory experiences occur most often within (1) supportive
cultural traditions, (2) mundane experiences can be interpreted as divine
communication, (3) most revelational experiences confirm rather than upturn
the existing religious culture, (4) validation of the revelation requires social
support, and (5) revelation occurs most often during times of crisis).
125. Turgeon, 2004 WL 555278; Applin, 67 P.3d 1152.
126. Turgeon, 2004 WL 555278, at *1; Applin, 67 P.3d at 1153.
127. Turgeon, 2004 WL 555278, at *1; Applin, 67 P.3d at 1154.
128. Turgeon, 2004 WL 555278, at *1 (emphasis added).
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doctrine is irrelevant.
Take, for example, the 1999 New Hampshire case of Mr.
Blair, who believed that God had commanded him to bring his
wife and child to a certain motel room and kill them there.129
Blair did not claim to be insane, rather the contrary; Blair
argued that God had revealed he would be thrown into a lake of
fire if he did not kill his wife and son.130 At trial, he testified: “in
my opinion, I’m sane. I acted under the command of God. I do
not suffer delusions or hallucinations . . . I was very rational . . .
I understood what I did.”131 If Shaw’s position is taken to its
logical conclusion, Blair should have been able to invoke deific
decree exoneration without claiming insanity.
Judge Cardozo had foreseen the concern that deific decree
exonerations would shade off into a kind of cultural excuse132 or
free-exercise defense,133 in the oft-cited case of People v.
Schmidt.134 Schmidt was the first United States case to give the
matter an extended discussion, albeit in dicta. Schmidt had
been arrested for the murder of Anna Aumuller, whose
dismembered body was found in the Hudson River.135 At trial,
Schmidt confessed to killing her, but claimed that he had
murdered her because “he had heard the voice of God calling
upon him to kill the woman as a sacrifice and atonement.”136
Two physicians “accepting as true his statement that he was
overpowered by this delusion, expressed the opinion that he was
insane,” while others opined that his “delusion was feigned, and
his insanity a sham.”137 The jury, agreeing with the latter,
convicted him of first-degree murder.138

129. State v. Blair, 732 A.2d 448 (N.H. 1999).
130. Id. at 449.
131. Id. at 450.
132. For a discussion of the “cultural defense,” see SANFORD H. KADISH
ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 349–350 (10th
ed. 2017).
133. See Hawthorne, supra note 12, at 1768 (stating “[t]he logical
modernization of deific decree would then be to extend it to include cultural
defenses of all types”).
134. 216 N.Y. 324 (1915).
135. Id. at 327.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 325.
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In a motion for a new trial, the Defendant confessed that his
insanity plea was indeed a sham, and that Anna had died of an
illegal abortion.139 Still, he argued, he was not guilty of her
death, but only guilty of trying to dispose of her body to protect
those who helped her procure that abortion.140 Additionally, the
Defendant requested a new trial on the ground that the jury
instructions regarding his insanity claim were faulty.141 New
York, like most jurisdictions then and now, followed the
M’Naghten test of insanity.142 Before a defendant could be
acquitted, he must show that he was “laboring under such a
defect of reason as: (1) not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or (2) not to know that the act was wrong.” 143
As in the Turgeon case, the defendant argued that wrong should
be defined as “morally wrong,” not “contrary to the law of the
state,” as the trial judge had instructed.144
Cardozo opined in dicta on the insanity instruction issue,
even though he acknowledged that the Defendant had waived
his insanity defense on appeal by conceding it was a sham. 145
Cardozo agreed with the Defendant that, in common law, wrong
was understood as “evil” or “moral wrong,” a deed “‘against the
laws of God and nature.’”146 Cardozo clarified that putting the
jury charge in terms of whether the Defendant knew the act was
“contrary to the law of the land” was misleading, because
ignorance of the law is no excuse.147 Instead, the question is
“whether the party accused had a sufficient degree of reason to
know that he was doing an act that was wrong” and “that act
was at the same time contrary to the law of the land.”148 Cardozo
also noted that M’Naghten itself held that those who, “under the
influence of insane delusion,” believe themselves to be
“redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or
of producing some public benefit,” though knowing they are
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
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Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 334–36.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 329–30.
Id.
Schmidt, 216 N.Y. at 333–34.
Id. at 333.
Id.
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acting “contrary to law” are not excused, because, as Shaw
pointed out, “a delusion that some supposed grievance or injury
will be redressed, or some public benefit attained, has no such
effect in obscuring moral distinctions as a delusion that God
himself has issued a command. The one delusion is consistent
with knowledge that the act is a moral wrong, the other is
not.”149 Cardozo then quoted Chief Justice Shaw’s language in
Commonwealth v. Rogers: “where he fully believes that the act
he is doing is done by the immediate command of God, and he
acts under the delusive but sincere belief that what he is doing
is by the command of a superior power, which supersedes all
human laws, and the laws of nature.”150
However, crucially, unlike Shaw, Cardozo goes on to make
clear that personal cultural or religious variations are not
sufficient by themselves to exonerate:
Obedience to the law is itself a moral duty. If,
however, there is an insane delusion that God has
appeared to the defendant and ordained the
commission of a crime, we think it cannot be said
of the offender that he knows the act to be wrong.
It is not enough, to relieve from criminal liability,
that the prisoner is morally depraved . . . . It is
not enough that he has views of right and wrong
at variance with those that find expression in the
law. The variance must have its origin in some
disease of the mind . . . . The anarchist is not at
liberty to break the law because he reasons that
all government is wrong. The devotee of a
religious cult that enjoins polygamy or human
149. Id. at 334–35. See, e.g., State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314 (N.J. 1990)
(holding no need for deific decree instruction where defendant merely held the
“idiosyncratic” moral belief that it was right for him to kill his friend to retrieve
his stolen wallet); State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983) (noting that
defendant claimed his Moscovite beliefs justified him in killing his wife, if he
believed her unfaithful. Court held that adherence to a religious code was not
the same as a direct command from God and could not exonerate him). But see
People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1985) (noting defendant who thought God
required him to kill his wife because his marriage vows said “till death do us
part” was entitled to a right/wrong M’Naghten instruction).
150. Id. at 336 (citing Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500
(1844)).
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sacrifice as a duty is not thereby relieved from
responsibility before the law . . . . In such cases
the belief, however false according to our own
standards, is not the product of disease.151
In other words, religious law does not “supersede all human
laws.”152 But that begs the question of whether a personal
appearance by God would do so. Cardozo seems to assume that
such a personal appearance would necessarily “have its origin in
some disease of the mind.”153
Cardozo thus distinguished direct divine command from
idiosyncratic religious or moral beliefs, even if he ducked Shaw’s
conclusion that a genuine deific decree would justify murder, by
presuming that experiencing a direct divine command would be
a delusion. Other courts have followed Cardozo in setting to one
side cases in which defendants proffer cultural differences or
alternative religious doctrines as their justification for
murder154—these cases are considered to be different from a true
visitation by God; but why?
The troubling case of State v. Singleton struggles to find an
answer.155 In that case, the Defendant tried to bring his mental
151. Id. at 340 (emphasis added).
152. Rogers, 48 Mass. at 503.
153. Schmidt, 704 P.2d at 784 n.16. The decision also does not settle
what would count as a “disease of the mind.” Id. If revelations themselves are
considered delusions, then there is no other evidence of mental illness. If
something more is required, as Russ Covey has demonstrated, the “product of
disease” requirement of M’Naghten is not much clarified, since a momentary
delusion or a personality disorder may be considered a mental disease. Id.;
Russell D. Covey, Temporary Insanity: The Strange Life and Times of the
Perfect Defense, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1597 (2011). As a result, Covey suggests that
insanity doctrine be understood as a safety valve of the law, allowing juries the
scope to have compassion for those whose minds are unusual. Covey, supra.
While Covey’s view is enticing, it does not solve the labeling problem: for a
religious killing to be exonerated through this form of jury “safety valve,” it
would still have to be called insanity. Id. at 1631–32.
154. See, e.g., Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1324 (defendant’s belief that “might
makes right” was a general moral belief and not a divine command); Crenshaw,
659 P.2d at 494 (Crenshaw’s “Moscovite” belief tenet that he had a duty to kill
an unfaithful wife was “not the same as acting under a deific command,” and
his awareness that not just the positive law of Washington State, but the
general “social standard of moral wrong” prohibited his act defeated his
insanity defense.).
155. 48 A.3d 285 (N.J. 2012).
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illness under control through group study of the Old Testament.
He “became obsessed” with study and “came to believe that God
communicate[d] with him, although he d[id] not claim to hear a
distinct voice speaking or commanding him. Rather, he
receive[d] messages or communications from God while
asleep.”156 He felt “a general obligation to kill sinners who did
not comport themselves in accordance with his beliefs about
God’s expectations, once he explained those expectations to
them,” and told various members of his family several different
times that he was being told to kill them for their sins.157 When
his girlfriend pressured him to take a job and work for money,
which he believed was the root of all evil, he became
progressively enraged with her.158 He shot and stabbed her
when she refused to give him her car keys so he could leave the
scene.159 After his arrest, he was asked if anyone else was
involved in her killing, and he answered: “No, the devil, god and
the devil (inaudible) inside of me, outside of me, all over the
place, all over the place.”160 The jury, given a M’Naghten style
instruction, convicted Singleton, and on appeal Singleton argued
that the jury should have received a separate deific decree
instruction.161 The New Jersey Supreme Court denied the
appeal.162
Despite testimony by both family members and a
psychiatrist that Singleton believed God was telling him directly
to kill specific people, a majority of the Supreme Court
characterized this case as one in which the Defendant “formed a
general belief that he ought to kill sinners” rather than “was
acting pursuant to a delusional command at the time of the
killing” which “deprived defendant of his ability to appreciate
society’s disapproval of his action.”163
The majority opinion provoked both a concurrence arguing
for the abolition of any “deific decree” instruction, and a
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 163–64.
Id. at 163, 168.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 168.
Singleton, 48 A.3d at 171–82.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 184–86.
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dissent.164 Justice Hoens, joined by Justice Albin in dissent,
pointed out that the majority was unreasonable to expect a
divine visitation to come only as “a booming voice from
heaven . . . found only in the cinema.”165 Moreover, Hoens
clarified the difference between “reliance on a moral code that is
on its face rational but unacceptable to our legal system,” and
deific decree doctrine:
The reason that the deific command qualifies as a
defense to murder is that it is the one corner of
insanity in which legal and moral wrong do not
coincide . . . . One who acts in accordance with a
sincerely held belief that he has been directed by
God to carry out a murder may well appreciate
that the crime is legally wrong, but will
nonetheless act on the directive because he
equally believes that it is a moral imperative.166
Both the majority and the dissent in Singleton, then,
implicitly accept Shaw’s premise that a command of God to do a
specific act, if true, would be right according to our society’s own
understanding of right and wrong, even though counter to a
general moral rule or law.167
The deific decree rule is
importantly limited to a specific command to do an act, not the
establishment of a new rule.168 Though the courts never explain
why they make this distinction in relation to deific decree
doctrine, the law elsewhere recognizes a justification for
exceptional, singular, lesser-evil cases of necessity. Perhaps
these judges accept the view that the law is entitled to assume
that God knows best in some unlooked-for case in which infinite
knowledge only could determine that murder was the necessary
lesser evil in some cosmic chain of events (e.g., killing Hitler as
a child). On the other hand, maybe they believe that the selfauthenticating nature of revelation can only be singular, as the
event of command is singular. Alternatively, it is possible that
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
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Id. at 200 (Hoens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 199 (Hoens, J., dissenting).
See generally Singleton, 48 A.3d 285.
Id.
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these cases demonstrate retention of a religiously positivist
understanding of moral truth—that the command of a god is the
final ground and test of ethical truth, and that this command,
grounded in the will of a supernatural being, is necessarily not
a rule but a personal willing of ‘thou shalt.’169 “Why is this right?
Because God said so.”170
Acknowledging that it is possible for law and God to diverge,
however, does not just create a problem in criminal insanity law,
it creates a problem for religious law. As religious traditions of
discernment show, and as the brief tour of history above notes,
revelation destabilizes all law—religious or secular. The
religious traditions that have been around longest have all
developed ways of insulating themselves from revelation or
sifting it carefully through a rule of recognition—indeed that is
the only way to avoid schism and dissolution.
1.

Religious Traditions of Discernment

Unlike many early Protestants, who maintained the
possibility of divine revelation contra law,171 many other
169. Cf. Philippe Nonet, What is Positive Law?, 100 YALE L.J. 667 (1990).
170. See also divine command theories of ethics, supra note 106.
171. See Frantick Hacket, supra note 45, at 46–47, 49, 50–52, 59–61
(discussing the dispute among Protestant clergy like William Perkins in 1587
over whether purportedly new prophets could be genuine. According to
Walsham, Perkins discounted those “who upheld heretical doctrine or lived
vicious lives” and who were “rash, unruly, and obstinate or ‘babling and
talkative’ rather than ‘silent with wisedom,’” who “spoke strangely and
opaquely, or whose utterances engendered not God’s glory but ‘foolish feare’
and ‘disquietnesse’ in the church and commonwealth.’” Hacket, however, who
became popular enough to warrant execution, was all of those things.
Walsham points out that in sixteenth century England, prophecy, witchcraft,
and insanity were equally likely to be diagnosed, with much disagreement
about how to judge between them. While “Calvinist theology clearly did more
to inhibit than encourage the appearance of popular prophets,” Walsham
argues, “this should not blind us to the fact that it created a climate in which
the idea that rational people might communicate with God and glimpse the
unseen could not be dismissed a priori as ridiculous. As yet each particular
case had to be seriously investigated and separately assessed—hence the
profound uncertainty of the puritan leaders.” Walsham argues that this
uncertainty in general resulted in acceptance of visionaries who did not
“threaten[] the integrity of the institutional church,” and denunciation as
lunatics, charlatans, or demoniacs of visionaries who did. Hacket, a
promiscuous brawler and “illiterate puritan messiah in Cheapside” who

45

ARTICLE 6_MEYER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

790

PACE LAW REVIEW

8/23/2019 6:37 PM

Vol. 39.2

religions acknowledged the chaotic nature of revelation (i.e., that
God is not always reasonable), but then worked out clear
institutional ways to cabin wayward prophecy and visions.
Mormon doctrine, while acknowledging ongoing personal
divine revelation, invests the bishop and church leaders with the
right to discern the true prophet from the false:
[A]nd unto the bishop of the church, and unto such
as God shall appoint and ordain to watch over the
church and to be elders unto the church, are to
have it given unto them to discern all those gifts
lest there shall be any among you professing and
yet be not of God.172
Jewish doctrine also places firm controls on prophecy and
miracle. It holds that a prophet can only be recognized once all
the Jewish people on Earth are gathered in the same land, for
God would not speak except to all the people together.173 No
threatened the Queen’s life was the perfect target of Anglican clerics who
wished to discredit all Calvinist and Presbyterian dissenters as “violent
incendiaries.” The puritan leaders, on the other hand, characterized Hacket
as insane. However, most of the time, it “was not evangelical Calvinists but
their conformist counterparts who began that great cosmological shift towards
a world in which miracles had ceased and divine providence no longer
intervened unpredictably.” “One consequence of this gradual ‘disenchantment
of the world’ was the repudiation of divine communication as part of legitimate
piety and its secularization or ‘somatization’ as a medical syndrome . . . . By
the 1750s, all manifestations of charismatic Protestantism were being
stigmatized as species of madness.” Calvinists, by contrast, even had a divine
explanation for insanity: “it was only when the deity withdrew his protective
presence from sinners that they were invaded by Satan and driven out of their
wits,” and insanity was a kind of divine punishment for sin or faithlessness
“inflicted by the devil acting as the Lord’s executioner”).
172. THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, DOCTRINES AND
COVENANTS, § 46, ¶27, https://www.lds.org/scriptures/dc-testament/dc/46?lang
=eng.
173. Ani Maamin 06, ORTHODOX UNION (Aug. 30, 2006), https://www.ou.or
g/judaism-101/glossary/ani-maamin-6/; MAIMONIDES, FOUNDATIONS OF TORAH,
ch. 8 (trans. Simon Glazer, 1924) (ebook) (“Moses our Master was not believed
in by Israel because he delivered tokens, for whosoever bases his belief
contingent upon tokens retains suspicion in his heart, for it is possible that the
token was delivered by means of enchantment and witchcraft . . . .
Consequently they to whom he was sent are the witnesses by whom the truth
of his prophecy is established, wherefor he needed no other token to deliver to
them, as they and he witnessed it together . . . . Therefore, if a prophet arose
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Jewish prophets have officially existed since the death of Haggi,
Zechariah, and Malachi around 300 BCE, before the diaspora.
In Jewish tradition, individual revelation is fallible and suspect,
and cannot bind or provide the foundations of a People’s faith. 174
Catholic traditions of canonization and miracle-discernment
play a similar role, and the many examples this long tradition
provides warrant a more extensive review of both the black
letter Catholic law of discernment and some of the cases in which
it was applied. As becomes apparent, canon law and Catholic
doctrine replay the same difficulties with deific decree analysis
as the secular courts do above. This parallel is revealing; it
demonstrates that what is at stake here is not so much a concern
with an establishment of religion, as with the proper extent of
community control of individual conscience. As so eloquently
framed by the juris-genitive and juris-pathic distinction in
Robert Cover’s famous article, Nomos and Narrative, while
nomos, or faith, is juris-genitive and authority-creating, the
institutionalization of that nomos always requires some jurispathic suppression of lawless revelation as heresy.175
a. The Catholic Example: Rules for Discernment
While even the early Church condemned false prophets, 176
Nancy Caciola pegs the beginning of the Catholic juridical
process for evaluating miracles and apparitions to the Fourth
Lateran Council of 1215 under Pope Innocent III: “Henceforth,
no individual’s supernatural powers or visions could be accepted
as divine in origin without rigorous investigation.”177 Further
rules regarding miracles were developed through later centuries
by Jean Gerson (1363-1429),178 Saint Ignatius of Loyola
and performed great tokens and miracles, and thereby seeks to deny the
prophecy of Moses our Master, we must not hearken unto him.”).
174. Id.
175. Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
176. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 13:4 (warning of false prophets).
177. CACIOLA, supra note 45, at 14.
178. Caciola argues that the increasing anxiety of the church around the
time of the Great Schism (1378-1417) resulted in assertion of greater control
over heresy, to the detriment of laity and especially of spiritual women, and
Gerson et al. placed more emphasis on non-corporeal, non-emotional, doctrinal
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(1548),179 and Benedict XIV in his Canonization of Saints.180
Gerson, writing in the period of Joan of Arc, puts forward a
coin metaphor for judging the true revelation from the false. In
discerning the true from the false spiritual coin, we must look,
he says, to “weight, flexibility, resistance, form, and color.” 181
Weight is determined by humility; the person who takes pride in
being worthy of visions “merits being the sport of illusions.” 182
Flexibility is determined by discretion; immoderate or
exaggerated fasting or weeping is a sign of vanity or mental
illness, not spirituality.183 Resistance is determined by patience;
those who immediately believe in a vision have not been
sufficiently reflective.184 Form is determined by truth; a vision
that is not in accordance with scripture and “good customs and
the true faith,” or prophecies that do not come to pass, or a divine
command “counter to good habits” “without the very clear
intervention of an order or dispensation of God” is false.185 Color
is determined by the experience of non-carnal love associated

markers of true prophecy: “[They singled out the laity and women as especially
unlikely candidates for divine inspiration . . . [and] directly blamed the
prophecies of laywomen (notably Brigit of Sweden and Catherine of Siena) for
the outbreak of the schism itself. . . [which] set the stage for the elaboration of
the witch stereotype by the succeeding generation of thinkers.” Id. at 16–17;
see also GERTZ, supra note 46, at 7–12, 50 (reporting that “[a]t the Council of
Constance in 1415, the chancellor of the University of Paris, Jean Gerson,
cautioned any confessor of a holy woman (they were at the time considering
Bridget of Sweden for sainthood) to ‘resist her, upbraid her harshly, scorn her’
for her pride rather than ‘praise’ her for exceptional living”). Gerson later
famously wrote in support of the authenticity of Jean D’Arc’s visions and
mission in 1429. Daniel Hobbins, Jean Gerson’s Authentic Tract on Joan of Arc:
Super Facto Puellae et Credulitate sibi Praestanda (14 May 1429), 67
MEDIEVAL STUDS. 99 (2005) (arguing Gerson was the actual author of this
work).
179. Rules for the Same Effect with Greater Discernment of Spirits, ST.
IGNATIUS LOYOLA, http://www.sacred-texts.com/chr/seil/seil79.htm (last visited
Apr. 17, 2019).
180. Fernando Vidal, Miracles, Science and Testimony in Post-Tridentine
Saint-Making, 20 SCI. CONTEXT 481 (2007).
181. W.P. BARRETT, THE TRIAL OF JEANNE D’ARC 518 (Coley Taylor & Ruth
H. Kerr, trans., Gotham House, Inc. 1932) (providing excerpts in translation of
Gerson’s treatise).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 521.
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with the vision.186
Saint Ignatius of Loyola, founder of the Jesuits, wrote in
1548 what has become the classic treatise on spiritual
discernment, which gives guidance to oneself for sifting true
revelation from other mental experiences.187 Loyola’s spiritual
advice suggests that the divine voice will always move one away
from sin and away from despair and toward publicity, while evil
spirits will move one toward selfish pleasures, secret desires,
and despair.188 These experiences of elation and depression
come and go, and when one is experiencing the elation of divine
consolation, one should recognize it as grace, not merit, and
remain humble.189 When one is experiencing desolation, one
should not make rash decisions, but be patient and keep to one’s
good actions, trusting that consolation will return and holding
to the memory of prior consolation.190 By extension, in
evaluating the genuineness of others’ spiritual experience,
looking to their actions and humility, rather than their emotive
moments of elation or depression, is key to discernment.191
Benedict XIV’s 1740 treatise reserves beatification and
canonization for those confessors whose writings are neither
contrary to sound doctrine nor good morals, who have a
reputation for sanctity, whose lives exhibit heroic virtue, and
who have been proven to do two to four miracles.192 Notably, the
miraculous alone will not suffice, for its provenance is always
equivocal.193 As Saint Thomas Aquinas wrote, a trance or
“[a]bstraction can occur from three causes. First, from a bodily
186. Id.
187. ST. IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA, RULES FOR THE SAME EFFECT WITH GREATER
DISCERNMENT OF SPIRITS, http://www.sacred-texts.com/chr/seil/seil79.htm (last
visited Apr. 17, 2019).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Camillo Beccari, Beatification and Canonization, CATHOLIC ENCYC.
www.newadvent.org/cathen/02364b.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
193. See, e.g., CACIOLA, supra at 45, at 18 (an anonymous clerical
commentator’s defense of Franciscan John of Rupescissa quoting “[h]e
predicted many future events as if through a prophetic spirit, and many people
doubted whether he was deceiving, or telling lies, or was speaking with a
python or an evil spirit. However, this man lived a holy life, sober and honest,
and was a cleric learned in scripture and in the texts of the sacred canon”).

49

ARTICLE 6_MEYER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

794

PACE LAW REVIEW

8/23/2019 6:37 PM

Vol. 39.2

cause, as is clear from those who through some infirmity are out
of their minds. Second, through the power of demons, as is seen
in those who are possessed. Third, from the divine power. It is
in this sense that we speak of ecstasy, when one is elevated to a
supernatural level by the divine spirit, with abstraction from the
senses.”194
The Church’s skepticism about religious experience—
trances, visions, and emotional ecstasies—continues through
the centuries. In the modern period, after an outbreak of Marian
visions,195 Pope Paul VI disseminated Norms Regarding the
Manner of Proceeding in the Discernment of Presumed
Apparitions or Revelations, made public only in 2012.196 This
1978 document included both positive and negative criteria for
determining the “authenticity and supernatural character” of an
alleged miracle or prophecy.197 These include: (1) “[m]oral
certitude, or at least great probability of the existence of the fact,
acquired by means of a serious investigation;” (2) “[p]ersonal
qualities” of those who witnessed the miracle, including
“psychological equilibrium, honesty and rectitude of moral life,
sincerity and habitual docility toward Ecclesiastical Authority,
the capacity to return to a normal regimen of a life of faith;” and
(3) “[h]ealthy devotion and abundant and constant spiritual fruit
(for example, spirit of prayer, conversion, testimonies of charity,
etc.).”198
Negative criteria include: (1) “[m]anifest error concerning
the fact;” (2) “[d]octrinal errors attributed to God himself, or to
194. Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
195. See Frederick M. Jelly, Discerning the Miraculous: Norms for
Judging Apparitions and Private Revelations, 44 MARIAN STUDS. 41, 43 (1993)
(making the point that miracles are, in Catholic tradition, far less important
than charity and church doctrine, and that even among “mystical phenomena,”
corporeal visions rank lower than imaginative (dreams) and intellectual ones
(“a simple intuitive understanding of a supernatural mystery”). Such visions
“do not make any substantial addition to the deposit of faith and morals
necessary for salvation,” id. at 44, compared to other “supernatural” gifts like
“acts of faith, hope, love; the infused virtues given by God; prayer, worship, the
spiritual and corporal works of mercy; transubstantiation,” id. at 44–45.
196. Norms Regarding the Manner of Proceeding in the Discernment of
Presumed Apparitions or Revelations, SACRED CONGREGATION DOCTRINE FAITH,
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cf
aith_doc_19780225_norme-apparizioni_en.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
197. Id.
198. Id.
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the Blessed Virgin Mary, or to some saint in their
manifestations, taking into account however the possibility that
the subject might have added, even unconsciously, purely
human elements or some error of the natural order to an
authentic supernatural revelation;” (3) “[e]vidence of a search for
profit or gain strictly connected to the fact;” (4) “[g]ravely
immoral acts committed by the subject or his or her followers
when the fact occurred or in connection with it;” (5)
“[p]sychological disorder or psychopathic tendencies in the
subject, that with certainty influenced on the presumed
supernatural fact, or psychosis, collective hysteria or other
things of this kind.”199
Decision on these factors was strictly confined to a
hierarchical decision-making process resembling trial and
appellate bodies (the bishop-commissioned Ordinary in the first
instance, relying on expert theologians, canonists, psychologists,
and doctors, with appeal of sorts to the Sacred Congregation,
which retained original jurisdiction in serious cases). The bishop
in charge can come to one of three conclusions: (1) the apparition
is true and worthy of belief (but belief is not required), (2) it is
not true, or (3) it is uncertain. The Pope does not make
pronouncements about the authenticity of apparitions:
[t]o prevent confusing such a judgment with the
exercise of his infallible teaching authority in
matters of faith and morals (i.e., matters which
must be believed and observed by all the faithful
for the sake of salvation).
The charism of
infallibility has not been given for the purpose of
judging apparitions and private revelations.200
While the Vatican seems to keep no official online lists of its
cases of Saints or miracles, other investigators set the count of
the beatified at 371, and the sanctified at 307, as of 2009. 201
199. Id.
200. Jelly, supra note 195, at 46; Junno Arocho Esteves, How the Church
Determines a True Marian Apparition, CRUX (Apr. 19, 2017),
https://cruxnow.com/vatican/2017/04/19/church-determines-true-marian-appa
rition/.
201. ROBERT J. BARRO ET AL., ECONOMICS OF SAINTHOOD (A PRELIMINARY
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According to another online amateur scholar, twenty-two
Marian apparitions have been investigated and received
episcopal approval by the Catholic Church. Nine have been
approved since 1900.202
b. The Catholic Example: Two Cases of Revelation
i.

Joan of Arc – 1431, 1455

The two trials of Joan of Arc present paradigmatic cases: the
first for heresy and, twenty years later, the second for
rehabilitation. Joan’s story remains unaccountable. A quiet,
pious farm girl living an unremarkable life suddenly begins
bossing around nobles, bishops, and kings, riding war horses,
directing battles, second-guessing generals, and wielding
lances.203 She convinces an arch-bishop and two sets of canon
lawyers and prelates of her divine mission and sincere faith. 204
Her key prophecies—the raising of the siege of Orleans, the
crowning of the Dauphin at Reims, the fall of Paris to the
French, the end of English rule in France, and the return of the
Duke of Orleans—all come to pass (though the last three only
after her execution), despite the fact that when she makes these
predictions, Henry VI is claiming both England and France, the
key cities are under English control, and the penniless
Dauphin’s own mother has denied his legitimacy.205 The record
of Joan’s trial, transcribed by notaries in the pay of her enemies,
shows her standing up to day after day of intense interrogation
in a roomful of well-educated and subtle churchmen, without
counsel, presumably without sleep (since she was celled with
INVESTIGATION) (February 2010), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/barro/files/s
aints_paper_020910.pdf.
202. MIRACLE HUNTER, http://www.miraclehunter.com/ (last visited Apr.
17, 2019). Approval of miracles is more common, especially healings.
According to the seven rules promulgated by Pope Benedict XIV, (1) the disease
must be serious; (2) the diagnosis must be certified; (3) it must be organic; (4)
no known therapy can explain the healing; (5) the healing must be instant and
unexpected; (6) the healing must be complete; and (7) the healing must be
definitive. Vidal, supra note 180.
203. W.S. SCOTT, THE TRIAL OF JOAN OF ARC (1956).
204. Id.
205. Id.
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three English male guards), with patience, wisdom, and
remarkable consistency.
In her trial for heresy, the procurators probed Joan’s story
for signs that the voices she claimed to be guided by were false
or demonic.206 Their questions, often odd and unaccountable by
contemporary lights, are clearly guided by an effort at
discernment, as laid out by Gerson, above.
Regarding pride: Did she think herself special for hearing
her voices? Did she believe herself to be in a state of grace? Did
she encourage others to worship her, or her relics? Did she hope
to gain treasure for herself? Did she humbly consult with priests
or clerics about her voices before acting? Here, there were many
probing questions about instances where women wanted to lay
hands on her, her disposal of her personal effects, gifts made to
her by the Dauphin, as well as whether she would submit to the
Church’s determination as to the validity of her voices.207 Her
answers left no impression of her wanting to be worshipped
herself; rather, she claimed that her voices could be heard by all,
if they merely listened. While she refused to be bound by the
determination of the partisan body trying her, she did agree to
be judged by the Pope (a fact later suppressed by Bishop
Cauchon).208 Her response to the trap set by the procurator’s
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 16–19, 126; RÉGINE PERNOUD, THE RETRIAL OF JOAN OF ARC:
THE EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL FOR HER REHABILITATION 252–53 (J.M. Cohen
trans. 1955). The notary of the original trial, Guillame Manchon, was a key
witness at the rehabilitation trial, and gave testimony that the final Latin
version of the trial record, and of the accusations, contained a number of
inaccuracies, and he presented his original French notes at the second trial.
Id. He also testified that the version of the official accusation that he had
signed had contained his corrections, but the corrected version was never sent.
Id. The Orleans manuscript is considered by W.S. Scott to be a copy of
Manchon’s original notes and differs in key respects from the remaining
manuscript copies of the official Latin version. SCOTT, supra note 203, at 16–
19. The other major evidentiary dispute is exactly what Joan eventually
admitted to when faced with the threat of execution. Several witnesses claim
that the short abjuration read to her and signed by her was mostly about
agreeing not to bear arms and to resume women’s dress, and there is some
dispute about whether she ever rejected her voices. The abjuration document
officially circulated after her execution was much longer and included many
other more serious admissions of heresy and witchcraft. See PERNOUD, supra,
at 258–61 (discussing this dispute). The text read to her at her abjuration, and
her later comments in her prison cell that demonstrated relapse, were not
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question regarding being in a state of grace became famous for
its wisdom: “if I am not, may God put me there; if I am, may He
keep me there,” though the content of her answer was not
original, but echoed a common prayer.209
Regarding instability: Did she show emotional instability or
mental illness? Did she live a chaste and moderate life? Did her
jumping out of a tower at Tours demonstrate despair or suicidal
impulses? Here, in light of her obvious common sense and
solemn Catholic responses, as well as her well-documented
virginity (tested before she came to the Dauphin by a group of
noblewomen210), the strained claims that she had practiced
witchcraft or prostitution or was suicidal rang particularly
hollow.
Regarding patience: Did she immediately believe that these
voices and visions came from God? She was asked to describe
her visions and voices in detail for signs that they were
demonic.211 She claimed they came with the church bells and
that she did not trust them at first, but came to believe their
counsel was good,212 as they enjoined her to behave and to go to
church often. In other words, she herself tested these voices by
the criteria of works.
Regarding truth: Did her predictions come true? Here, it
was pointed out that, at the time of her trial, many of these
predictions, especially about battles to be won at Paris and the
return of the Duke of Orleans, had not come to pass. Did she
have some spiritual “sign” that her revelations were legitimate?
Much questioning concerned how she proved to the Dauphin
that she had come from God. She often refused to answer this
question, as her sign, she said, was for him only, and that only
contemporaneously recorded by any notary but reported by witnesses. Id.
Scott’s source has her briefly rejecting the validity of her voices, but reaffirming
them the next day (as she dons men’s dress), and blaming herself for doubting.
SCOTT, supra note 203, at 169–70. If she was sexually assaulted while in a
dress, as witnesses at her rehabilitation claimed she asserted, she may well
have thought it her punishment for disobeying her voices. But the
rehabilitation trial witnesses deny that she ever disavowed the divinity of her
voices. PERNOUD, supra, at 206–07, 209–11, 215.
209. Katharine Lualdi, “Joan, Are You in a State of Grace?”: Joan of Arc
and Late Medieval Catechesis, 32 J. WESTERN SOC’Y FRENCH HIST. 1, 8 (2004).
210. SCOTT, supra note 203, at 12.
211. Id. at 67, 73, 78–79, 80, 85–86, 88, 90, 105, 120–21, 146–47.
212. Id. at 120.
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he could confirm it.213 After this question was repeated again
and again, she gave the judges a kind of parable, saying that the
sign was an angel offering a golden crown—a metaphoric
description of herself.214 Later, Charles said that the real sign
was that she knew the contents of the prayer he had privately
offered a few days before, and that she had recognized him
despite his hiding behind others when she first arrived.215 It is
clear that Joan’s interrogators at both trials were looking for
some divine sign that was intersubjective—seen or confirmed by
someone other than her.
Did her life accord with Scripture and good morals? Much
was made here of her failure to dress as a woman—an easily
proved and obvious deviation from the customs and rules of the
Church at the time.216 When she finally consented, however, to
wear a dress in her cell, she was either denied other clothes, or
she was sexually assaulted,217 and she reclaimed her soldier’s
attire.218 This relapse in dress then became an easily provable
legal basis on which to show that her submission to the Church
was insincere and to justify the Church’s decision to abandon her
to English secular justice—and to the stake (only relapsed
heretics could be executed).219
The final sermon preached to her demonstrates the
irreconcilable conflict between the intersubjectivity of law and
reason (even canon law), and the subjective, personal experience
of revelation. The core of Joan’s heresy, according to her
accusers, was that she trusted her own uneducated judgment
about the divinity of her voices.220 She rejected the Court’s
judgment that her visions and voices were either false or
demonic, and she refused to submit to the hierarchy of the
213. Id. at 69, 77, 80, 88, 101–02, 107.
214. Id. at 15.
215. Id. at 15–16. Her loyalty to Charles was also demonstrated at her
public recantation, when she interrupted the harangue against her heresy only
when it touched Charles, and she then protested that her king was a good
Catholic. PERNOUD, supra note 208.
216. SCOTT, supra note 203, at 134–35.
217. PERNOUD, supra note 208, at 209–10.
218. SCOTT, supra note 203, at 14.
219. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 571–83 (also known as
“obstinate” or “obdurate” heresy).
220. SCOTT, supra note 203, at 160.
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church:
[I]f such apparitions [in the likeness of angels or
saints] appear to you, do not believe them, but
reject and cast out such follies and imaginations,
in agreement with the statements and opinions of
the University of Paris and the other doctors, who
are conversant with and understand God’s law
and the Holy Scriptures; to whom it seems that
one should give no credence to such apparitions
and other novelties, unless they are justified in
Holy Scripture or by some other sign as being
miraculous. In these you have believed most
lightly, without having recourse to God in devout
prayer, in order that you might be made certain in
the matter; nor have you had recourse to any
prelate or other wise and learned churchman, who
would have been able to inform you of the truth;
which, considering your condition and the
simplicity of your knowledge, you ought to have
done.221
Joan, then, was condemned and burned for her faith in her
self-authenticating personal revelations and for her refusal to
accept religious law in their stead.
ii. The Rosary Messages – 1988
In the modern period, Father Jelly explains how the
Church’s 1978 criteria were applied by a visitation committee
investigating a purported vision by a small congregation of
charismatic Catholics in Lubbock Texas in 1988, known as the
“Rosary Messages.”222 The events began when ten parishioners
smelled roses and felt the presence of Mary while saying the

221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, Lubbock Journal; Reports of Miracle Draw
Throngs, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/17/us/l
ubbock-journal-reports-of-miracles-draw-throngs.html; Jelly, supra note 195,
at 41.
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rosary.223 Some of the congregants began to receive messages,
experience healings, and see visions, and an increasing number
of the faithful and curious (around 12,000) began to join them to
experience wonders during the praying of the rosary,
culminating in a vision of Jesus at sunset.
When the episcopal committee examined these messages
and healings, it concluded that, while they were generally
“within the boundaries of sound Roman Catholic teaching and
Christian tradition,” some messages “did betray an angry God in
language that was strident and affected and caused us to
question their claim to divine inspiration.”224 The committee
concluded that “[the messages and healings] were not of
miraculous origin but were inner locutions of the recipients,
derived from their spiritual reading, the preaching they had
heard, and from their own meditation or contemplative
prayer.”225 As for those seeing visions, they “must be warned
against the harmful effects of gazing at the sun, as well as
against an other-worldly attitude suggesting that they abandon
their sources of economic support.”226 The committee cautioned
that “the piety engendered be not individualistic, but rather that
it lead to real community and social concern.”227 Jelly concludes:
We cannot build our faith on the sand of alleged
apparitions and private revelations, regardless of
how well-intentioned the individuals involved
might be. If we believe that our salvation
depends on what is found in private revelation,
or if we place—with vain credulity or naivete—
our confidence in private revelations, we are
mistaken and are not building our faith on a solid
foundation, namely, the Word of God, Scripture,
tradition, and the teaching of the Church.228

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Jelly, supra note 195, at 49.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. at 54.
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Here, of course, is the crux of the problem: reason is
accessible to all; revelation is individualistic. As in the Jewish
tradition, the Catholic tradition looks askance on private,
personal access to God’s will that is not accessible to all the
people at once. Like reason, and like law, revelation in these
traditions is only acceptable if intersubjective, capable of testing,
mediated by fair process, in accordance with established law and
custom, and generally accessible and applicable to all equally. If
it is not, then, under church law, it is not to be considered likely
true revelation. In this way, one might say that religions with a
long history have a law of revelation that turns revelation into
law, very like Kant’s Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone.229 Personal experience of God’s will may be a helpful
personal devotional crutch, but can never overturn ethical
doctrine. Any deific command that violates ethical duties cannot
be legitimate.
Some have argued that the established church’s role in
disciplining heresy and revelation should enable a kind of
jurisdictional federalism between church and state. Steven
Smith, for example, has argued that the First Amendment
religion clauses could be read to protect only religious
institutions, not personal conscience.
Thus, he argues,
individual deviation from secular law, as opposed to a church
law’s deviation from secular law, would be well-within the
secular law’s jurisdiction.230 Though Smith does not address the
deific decree cases, one might extend his argument about
jurisdictional separation to claim that personal revelations
unsupported by religious institutions should not be protected by
the religion clauses of the First Amendment at all, and the deific
decree excuse should be a non-starter, because even under
church law, murder could never be justified. Hence, deific
decrees unblessed by church doctrine should not be a defense,
not because secular law trumps religion, but because religious
institutions have already ruled out such a defense as contrary to
church doctrine. While it may be tempting to recognize or
resurrect a jurisdictional federalism of church and state law,
229. See generally RELIGION, supra note 91.
230. Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church, in
LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES:
ACCOMMODATION AND ITS LIMITS 249 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012).
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Smith’s approach displaces the conflict between reason and
revelation, but does not eliminate it. Secular courts will still
have to decide what counts as a church, an exercise fraught with
establishment clause difficulties, especially because it is often
the prophet that creates a church in the first place. The problem
of revelation’s radical undermining of law is not, therefore, a
problem of church versus state, for revelation undermines all
law, whether church law or state law. As Jean of Arc’s accusers
argued, there can be no self-authenticating prophet recognized
from within the institution of a pre-existing church, for a selfauthenticating prophet creates a new church by that very act.
As Benedict XIV’s treatise implies, no Catholic saint can be
sanctified by miracle alone. A deific decree defense that would
rely on a pre-existing “church” for its authentication would chase
its tail.
2.

Revelation and Genius

Writing within a decade or so of Cardozo’s opinion in
Schmidt, playwright George Bernard Shaw, contra Cardozo,
sees the irrational revelation and unlikely prophet not as insane,
or as particularly religious, but as centrally important to the
individual conscience and entrepreneurial spirit. In his play
about Joan of Arc, Saint Joan, Shaw characterizes Joan of Arc
as a proto-Protestant martyr who embodies the spirit of
individualism.231 His paean to Joan might be read from this side
of the Atlantic as a celebration of the anti-hierarchical and
democratic nature of American political and spiritual life232—a
celebration that echoes, perhaps, Emerson’s transcendentalism,
presages the American evangelical movement, the American
231. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, SAINT JOAN (1924).
232. Amanda Porterfield, A History of Ambivalence: How Religion and
U.S. Law Have Developed Together, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: ACCOMMODATION AND ITS LIMITS 21 (Austin
Sarat, ed., 2012) (also suggesting that personal revelation has a peculiarly
American character: “religious expression has been channeled into grooves
shaped by the law’s more predominant emphasis on protection of private
property and individual rights. Religion in the United States has become more
commercial and more individualistic relative to the law’s privileging of
property and persons, and relative to the ambivalent relationship between
property and persons that have characterized American law”).
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fascination with superheroes and celebrities, and the individual
specialism that has been both our bane and our blessing.
Shaw writes:
Joan’s voices and visions have played many
tricks with her reputation. They have been held
to prove that she was mad, that she was a liar and
impostor, that she was a sorceress (she was
burned for this), and finally that she was a saint.
They do not prove any of these things; but the
variety of the conclusions reached shew how little
our matter-of-fact historians know about other
people’s minds, or even about their own. There
are people in the world whose imagination is so
vivid that when they have an idea it comes to
them as an audible voice, sometimes uttered by a
visual figure. Criminal lunatic asylums are
occupied largely by murderers who have obeyed
voices. Thus a woman may hear voices telling her
that she must cut her husband’s throat and
strangle her child as they lie asleep; and she may
feel obliged to do what she is told. By a medicolegal superstition it is held in our courts that
criminals whose temptations present themselves
under these illusions are not responsible for their
actions, and must be treated as insane. But the
seers of visions and the hearers of revelations are
not always criminals. The inspirations and
intuitions
and
unconsciously
reasoned
conclusions of genius sometimes assume similar
illusions. Socrates, Luther, Swedenborg, Blake
saw visions and heard voices just as Saint Francis
and Saint Joan did . . . . [T]here are forces at work
which use individuals for purposes far
transcending the purpose of keeping these
individuals alive and prosperous and respectable
and safe and happy in the middle station of
life . . . . Our Churches must admit that no official
organization of mortal men . . . can keep pace with
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the private judgment of persons of genius.233
The destabilizing voice of the unlikely prophet, and the
American embrace of both the “private judgment of persons of
genius” and Protestant evangelical movements, from the time of
Nathaniel Hawthorne to the California Gatekeepers, are at the
heart of Cardozo’s concern that the deific decree cases not allow
cultural or personal moral peculiarities to excuse murder.234
However, George Bernard Shaw reminds us that madness is also
divine inspiration, which has been understood as the most
authentic and trustworthy expression of truth—a truth beyond
the boundaries of common human law and everyday
understanding—since at least Plato’s Phaedrus.235
3.

Revelation and Revolution

Revelation has also been associated with revolution, when a
claim of divine justice is made that requires violence. The
American parallel to Joan of Arc is Nat Turner. Nat Turner led
an insurrection in Virginia in August of 1831 in which twenty to
forty enslaved African Americans killed fifty-five white people,
most of them women and children, before they were scattered
and captured by armed local militia members.236 The attacks set
off a widespread panic throughout the white South, resulting in
retaliatory murders and further restrictions on enslaved people.
Thomas Gray, a white lawyer, interviewed Turner in prison
to ask him why he did this.237 Turner calmly and clearly
explained that he had a mission from God.238 The signs of his
special mission included that: he was born with “certain
marks”239 on his head that his parents interpreted as meaning
233. SHAW, supra note 231.
234. Id.
235. ROBINSON, supra note 24, at 24.
236. Scot A. French, The Confessions of Nat Turner (1831), ENCYC. VA.,
https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/_The_Confessions_of_Nat_Turner_1831
(last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
237. Id.
238. THE CONFESSIONS OF NAT TURNER: WITH RELATED DOCUMENTS
(Kenneth S. Greenburg, ed. 2017) [hereinafter CONFESSIONS].
239. Id. at 42 (giving a helpful caution regarding reading this document—
Gray clearly interjects his voice at some points in Turner’s narrative, but the
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he was “intended for some great purpose;” as a child he had
knowledge of things that had happened before he was born; he
was often told as a child that he “had too much sense to be raised,
and, if I was, I would never be of any service to any one as a
slave;”240 and he was precocious, learning to read without being
taught, and curious about everything, especially science and
religion.241 He became a natural leader at a young age, and he
often read the Bible, prayed, and fasted, becoming known as a
preacher and a healer.242 He began to have visions of “white
spirits and black spirits engaged in battle” and of the “lights of
the Saviour’s hands, stretched forth from east to west, even as
they were extended on the cross on Calvary for the redemption
of sinners.”243 He prayed “to be informed of a certainty of the
meaning thereof.”244 In apparent answer to these prayers, he
discovered “drops of blood on the corn” and “found on the leaves
in the woods hieroglyphic characters and numbers, with the
forms of men in different attitudes, portrayed in blood, and
representing the figures I had seen before in the heavens.”245
From this, he concluded, “the great day of judgment was at
hand.”246 This conclusion was further confirmed by a miraculous
healing he performed on a white man, and by a solar eclipse. 247
Convinced he was called to “fight against the Serpent” and help
Christ ensure that “the first should be last and the last should
be first,” he began to plan how he would “slay [his] enemies with
their own weapons.”248 He planned with six of his closest friends
to start this divine violence at his own master’s house and “until
[they] had armed and equipped [them]selves, and gathered
sufficient force, neither age nor sex was to be spared.”249 The

religious imagery and language is likely to be Turner’s, given the very prosaic
voice of Gray’s introduction).
240. Id. at 43 (repeating this phrase twice in the narrative, and again,
would seem to be in Turner’s voice, rather than Gray’s).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 44.
244. CONFESSIONS, supra note 238.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 45.
247. Id. at 45–46.
248. CONFESSIONS, supra note 238, at 46.
249. Id.
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band visited the wrath of God on eleven farms that night,
including a household of ten white school children, who were all
cut down or shot.250 They spared neither women who asked for
quarter, nor infants.251
Like Joan of Arc, Turner did not show signs of insanity in
the rest of his life, but was extremely bright and a trusted and
hard worker.252 Even in Turner’s prison cell, Thomas Gray
seems surprised to encounter Turner’s “intelligence” and “calm,
deliberate composure:”
It has been said he was ignorant and cowardly,
and that his object was to murder and rob for the
purpose of obtaining money to make his escape. It
is notorious, that he was never known to have a
dollar in his life; to swear an oath, or drink a drop
of spirits. As to his ignorance, he certainly never
had the advantages of an education, but he can
read and write, (it was taught him by his parents,)
and for natural intelligence and quickness of
apprehension, is surpassed by few men I have
ever seen. As to his being a coward, his reason as
given for not resisting Mr. Phipps, shews [sic] the
decision of his character . . . . He is a complete
fanatic, or plays his part most admirably. On
other subjects he possesses an uncommon share of
intelligence, with a mind capable of attaining any
thing; but warped and perverted by the influence
of early impressions.253
Like Joan, Turner was unrepentant, convinced of his divine
mission even in defeat.254 Like Joan’s, Turner’s prophetic visions
of “white spirits and black spirits engaged in battle” were

250. Id. at 49.
251. Id. at 46 (“it was quickly agreed we should commence at home . . .
and until we had armed and equipped ourselves, and gathered sufficient force,
neither age nor sex was to be spared, (which was invariably adhered to)”).
252. Id. at 1, 9, 46, 52–53.
253. Id. at 52.
254. Id.
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fulfilled a few decades after his death, with the Civil War.255
Like the Catholic Church, the South reacted by cracking down
on heresy: African American enslaved people were no longer to
learn to read (even the Scriptures) nor preach, nor form
congregations, but could attend church only with their white
masters, and those considered potential revolutionaries were
killed in the cruelest of ways.256
D. It’s All God Anyway (Law is Irrelevant)
“You say that I am guilty. Impious and rash!
Thus to usurp the prerogatives of your Maker!
To set up your bounded views and halted reason,
as the measure of truth!”257

From one extreme of this taxonomy, at which law cannot
take revelation seriously, we arrive at the other extreme, where
revelation gives no weight to law, be it secular or religious. From
the standpoint of revelation alone, laws are foolish, religious
doctrines of discernment irrelevant, for even the devil is merely
an instrument of the divine.258
There is an extreme arrogance in such self-authenticating,
individual claims of revelation that seems to run through
American culture, undercutting all forms of law. Inspired, or
fascinated, by several egregious cases of murder-by-divinedecree in 1780s America, in which devout men, after quiet
contemplation with their Bibles, slaughtered their families to
purify their souls,259 Charles Brockden Brown wrote the first
255. Id. at 44.
256. CONFESSIONS, supra note 238, at 20 (Greenburg introduction).
257. CHARLES BROCKDEN BROWN, WIELAND: OR, THE TRANSFORMATION, AN
AMERICAN TALE 205 (Invisible College Press 2001) (1857).
258. Compare Calvinist reaction, with Frantick Hacket, supra note 45.
259. William Beadle & James Yates, An Account of a Murder Committed
by Mr. J—Y-—upon his Family, in December. A.D. 1781., N.Y. WKLY. MAG.,
July 27, 1796, at 20, 28. Other cases are recounted in Marsh, The Great Sin of
Striving with God (1783) and Stephen Mix Mitchell, A Narrative of the Life of
William Beadle (1783). Stan Krauss found earlier cases in which suspected
witches were killed: Thomas Goss (1785) murdered his family because he
thought his wife was a witch and God would protect him. Goss refused a
legislative pardon. In 1799, in New York, John Pastano received a legislative
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American novel in 1793.260 Wieland: or, The Transformation, An
American Tale, explores the implications of deific decree murder
at precisely this point where all forms of discernment fail and
revelation is completely self-authenticating.261
Clara, who narrates the novel in a somewhat unreliable
epistolary fashion, lives a perfect Jane Austen life of
conversation and education with her brother Wieland, sister-inlaw Catherine, and Wieland’s rationalist friend Pleyel (for whom
Clara secretly carries a torch).262 This idyll is interrupted when
the mysterious Carwin shows up at their door—an
extraordinarily fascinating and highly intellectual vagrant. 263
Soon afterwards, the intellectual quartet begins hearing
voices.264 Clara is haunted by voices of burglars in the closet. 265
Wieland hears his wife Catherine’s voice under circumstances
that make that impossible.266 Pleyel believes he overhears Clara
seducing Carwin.267 Off-stage, Wieland comes to believe from
his experience of these impossible voices that he can at last
speak directly to God.268 To prove his singular devotion to God,
God demands that Wieland sacrifice his wife and children. 269
Later in the novel, Wieland kills them, believing that God has
commanded this, and that his act is innocent.270
Carwin turns out to be a ventriloquist who has caused much
of the group’s confusion and anxiety, including the break-up of
the romance of Clara and Pleyel.271 Carwin does not, however,
acknowledge responsibility for Wieland’s God-voices that decree
his murders.
pardon after killing his family. See also ROBINSON, supra note 24. Midelfort
recounts a similar notorious case in Wurttemberg, in 1590, in which a master
dyer “murdered his wife and attacked his four children in their beds,” after
accusing his wife of witchcraft. MIDELFORT, supra note 41, at 183.
260. BROWN, supra note 257.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. BROWN, supra note 257.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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All along, the actions of the humans seem trivially wrong at
worst, yet result in horrific consequences they are unable to
imagine or forfend. As John Matteson’s introduction points out,
the power of human understanding and effective action is
undermined throughout. Coincidence and fate seem to magnify
the consequences of Carwin’s random acts of ventriloquism,
which are motivated merely by caprice, jealousy, and
expedience, threading them along like beads into a sinister
plotline that seems the product of demonic malice, not mischief.
The provenance of Wieland’s “voice of God” is never
completely settled, leaving it undecided whether it was Carwin
(who perhaps continues to deceive Clara and others), a fraud by
Clara as an untrustworthy narrator, God, a demon, or a form of
insanity.272 The book also fails to settle whether Wieland
himself can be held responsible for his homicides. Clara ends
the novel with an anodyne conclusion that: “If Wieland had
framed juster notions of moral duty, and of the divine attributes;
or if I had been gifted with ordinary equanimity or foresight, the
double-tongued deceiver would have been baffled and
repelled.”273 Yet, given Wieland’s character as the admirer of
Cicero, as the grave and “indefatigable student”274 of the history
of religious opinions who deemed it “indispensable to examine
the ground of his belief, to settle the relation between motives
and actions, the criterion of merit, and the kinds and properties
of evidence”275 with a mind “enriched by science,”276 in which
“moral necessity, and Calvinistic inspiration, were the props on
272. Wieland’s uncle, Thomas Cambridge says: “Carwin, perhaps, or
heaven, or insanity, prompted the murderer; but Carwin is unknown.” BROWN,
supra note 257, at 188. The framing story of Clara and Wieland’s father, who
died in a mysterious white flame after being convinced that he had forfeited
heavenly favor by refusing a divine commandment, both keeps open the
possibility of an inherited madness, and of a genuine divine or demonic
visitation: “Was this the penalty of disobedience? This the stroke of a
vindictive and invisible hand? Is it a fresh proof that the divine Ruler interferes
in human affairs, meditates an end, selects, and commissions his agents, and
enforces by unequivocal sanctions, submission to his will? Or, was it merely
the irregular expansion of the fluid that imparts warmth to our heart and our
blood, caused by the fatigue of the preceding day, or flowing, by established
laws, from the condition of his thoughts?” Id. at 27.
273. Id. at 282.
274. Id. at 32.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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which my brother thought proper to repose,”277 Clara’s
indictment rings hollow. The book makes it difficult to believe
that the murders occurred because Wieland had not adequately
studied “moral duty” or the “divine attributes.”278
Another possibility is that the group’s very isolation and
insularity creates the tragedy. Wieland is very much like his
own religion-obsessed father, who:
[A]llied himself with no sect, because he perfectly
agreed with none. Social worship is that by which
they are all distinguished; but this article found
no place in his creed. He rigidly interpreted that
precept which enjoins us, when we worship, to
retire into solitude, and shut out every species of
society. According to him devotion was not only a
silent office, but must be performed alone . . . .
His system was embraced not, accurately
speaking, because it was the best, but because it
had been expressly prescribed to him.279
Clara tells us that Wieland’s studies likewise were solitary,
and no community of believers or church institution, other than
that provided by the small family group, filtered or discussed his
conclusions.280 Indeed, he never speaks of his conviction that
God is communicating directly to him until after he has acted on
His command.
Wieland’s confession reads like a passage of scripture, or a
Jonathan Edwards sermon, using the archaic second person
“thous” and “thines” rather than the more informal language he
uses in the rest of the novel. The intense first-person focus,
moreover, confirms a kind of inspired insular solipsism.281

277. Id. at 34.
278. BROWN, supra note 257, at 282.
279. Id. at 18.
280. Id.
281. BROWN, supra note 257, at 161 (“It is needless to say that God is the
object of my supreme passion . . . . A voice spake like that which I had before
heard—’Thou hast done well; but all is not done—the sacrifice is incomplete—
thy children must be offered— they must perish with their mother!’”).
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If my judges are unable to discern the purity of my
intentions, or to credit the statement of them,
which I have just made; if they see not that my
deed was enjoined by heaven; that obedience was
the test of perfect virtue, and the extinction of
selfishness and error, they must pronounce me a
murderer.
They refuse to credit my tale; they impute my
acts to the influence of daemons; they account me
an example of the highest wickedness of which
human nature is capable; they doom me to death
and infamy. Have I power to escape this evil? If I
have, be sure I will exert it. I will not accept evil
at their hand, when I am entitled to good; I will
suffer only when I cannot elude suffering.
You say that I am guilty. Impious and rash!
Thus to usurp the prerogatives of your Maker! To
set up your bounded views and halted reason, as
the measure of truth!
Thou, Omnipotent and Holy! Thou knowest
that my actions were conformable to thy will. I
know not what is crime; what actions are evil in
their ultimate and comprehensive tendency or
what are good. Thy knowledge, as they power, is
unlimited. I have taken thee for my guide, and
cannot err. To the arms of thy protection, I entrust
my safety. In the awards of thy justice, I confide
for my recompense.
Come death when it will, I am safe. Let
calumny and abhorrence pursue me among men;
I shall not be defrauded of my dues. The peace of
virtue, and the glory of obedience, will be my
portion hereafter.282
282. Id. at 204–05. Wieland’s confession is very similar in substance,
style and tone to that of John Yates, at least as recounted by a reporter for the
New York Weekly Magazine in 1796. See Beadle & Yates, supra note 259. The
Yates news account also seems eerily similar to the facts of a familicide that
occurred in 1755, so it may be itself somewhat fictionalized. See NEIL
WEBSDALE, FAMILICIDAL HEARTS: THE EMOTIONAL STYLES OF 211 KILLERS (2010)
(recounting the 1755 family murder by John Myrack in Pennsylvania in which
the mode of killing was very similar (hitting two childrens’ skulls against a
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Clara and her uncle later debate the sincerity and sanity of
Weiland’s confession. Her uncle believes Weiland is insane, but
Clara demurs: “none but a command from heaven could have
swayed his will; and nothing but unerring proof of divine
approbation could sustain his mind in its present elevation.”283
Wieland later breaks loose from confinement and confronts
Clara directly, confusing her more still, and even threatening to
kill her:
Once it was the scope of my labours to destroy
thee, but I was prompted to the deed by heaven;
such, at least, was my belief. Thinkest thou that
thy death was sought to gratify malevolence? No.
I am pure from all stain. I believed that my God
was my mover!
Neither thee nor myself have I cause to
injure. I have done my duty, and surely there is
merit in having sacrificed to that, all that is dear
to the heart of man. If a devil has deceived me, he
came in the habit of an angel. If I erred, it was
not my judgment that deceived me, but my senses.
In thy sight, being of being! I am still pure. Still
will I look for my reward in thy justice!284
Clara remains uncertain:
Perhaps this was merely a transition of his
former madness into a new shape. Perhaps he had
rock, killing a nursing infant, and burning his wife’s face so as to be
unrecognizable)). Websdale also discusses murders by James Purrington, in
1780 in Maine, who killed his family with an axe and a razor, and that of John
Beadle, in Connecticut in 1782, which was preceded by a “last supper” of
oysters for his “flock,” after which he chloroformed his family members and
methodically cut their throats. Websdale also recounts Yates’ murder, but
relies on the same source as above. The Beadle, Yates, and Purrington murders
were all committed by fathers who were allegedly loving and upright, all were
connected with religious commands or beliefs, and Websdale suggests that
they were all committed by “deists” who were outside of established churches.
Nothing is known about the motivation for the Myrack murders. Beadle
apparently believed in predestination. Id.
283. BROWN, supra note 257, at 210.
284. Id. at 260.
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not yet awakened to the memory of the horrors
which he had perpetrated. Infatuated wretch that
I was! To set myself up as a model by which to
judge of my heroic brother! My reason taught me
that his conclusions were right; but conscious of
the impotence of reason over my own conduct;
conscious of my cowardly rashness and my
criminal despair, I doubted whether any one could
be stedfast and wise.285
Then, Wieland twists the narrative again: “‘Clara,’ he
continued, advancing closer to me. ‘thy death must come. This
minister is evil, but he from whom his commission was received
is God. Submit then with all thy wonted resignation to a decree
that cannot be reversed or resisted.”286
Here is the turning point that Brown makes clear to us: for
Wieland, it no longer matters whether the voice he hears is divine
or demonic—for even evil is controlled by God. Wieland is still,
ultimately, a divine agent, because God is all. Law, good and
evil, have all disappeared.287 Wieland’s Calvinist predestination
(mentioned earlier) takes its final turn. If all individual action
is directed by a grander, unknown narrative, then there is no
responsibility, and no place for adjudication or for human law.
There is only resignation to an inevitable destiny that allows
murder or nurture, seemingly at random.
Just as Wieland is about to strangle Clara, he is rebuked
aloud by another mysterious voice and told that he is insane. 288
Brown is intentionally obscure about whether this voice is
Carwin’s ventriloquism, whether Clara imagines the voice, or
285. Id.
286. Id. at 261.
287. Id. For an eerie recent parallel, see Lyndsay Winkley, Woman
Waving Handgun, Carrying Baby, Threatens to Blow Up Church During Easter
Service, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.officer.com/co
mmand-hq/technology/security-surveillance/news/21077241/woman-wavinggun-carrying-baby-threatens-to-blow-up-church-during-easter-service (“Conkey posted her last video hours before . . . . In it, she claims that Jesus and Satan
are one and that she was sent to reveal the truth to the masses. ‘If God decides
to blow your minds by appearing as someone very unexpected and doing very
unexpected things and saying crazy, crazy stuff, maybe you should listen,’ she
said”).
288. Id.
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whether God himself speaks (“a voice, louder than human
organs could produce”289 ),but the voice stops Wieland from
killing Clara.290 Believing that he is insane and not guided by
God is the one outcome Wieland cannot bear; the one outcome
that denies him status as a divine agent.291 Wieland, in his
despair at the senselessness of his actions, stabs himself.292
By this point, Clara has lost any sense of the point of having
discernment and does not care where the voice came from: “Be it
so: I care not from what source these disasters have flowed; it
suffices that they have swallowed up our hopes and our
existence. What his agency began, his agency conducted to a
close . . . . Such is his tale, concerning the truth of which I care
not.”293 Note that her language changes here to the same kind
of biblical sing-song used by Wieland in his confession, and one
wonders, not for the first time, about Clara’s own sanity. With
the loss of a reliable narrator, the reader now has no firm grasp
on reality and is flung, along with the characters, into a
fractured surreal.
Wieland was written after the American religious Great
Awakening had solidified the position of new evangelical faiths,
all of which placed a great deal of emphasis on personal
conversion narratives and religious experiences.294 In the novel,
Wieland explicitly mentions the Moravians and their leader
Zinzendorf as objects of his study.295 The Moravians were a
“close-knit communitarian body . . . pacifistic, intensely
devout.”296 Clara’s narration also connects Wieland’s
contemplations with doctrines of Calvinism, which in this period
was intensely focused on the doctrine of predestination and
election. In short, Moravians were quietists; Calvinists were
289. BROWN, supra note 257, at 265.
290. Id.
291. Cf. SHAW, supra note 231, at act VI (Saint Joan recantation scene).
292. BROWN, supra note 257, at 265.
293. Id. at 216.
294. GAUSTAD & SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 108 (2002); see also SHAI LAVI,
THE MODERN ART OF DYING: A HISTORY OF EUTHANASIA IN THE UNITED STATES
(2005).
295. BROWN, supra note 257, at 19.
296. GAUSTAD & SCHMIDT, supra note 5; see also David Zimmerman,
Charles Brockden Brown and the Conundrum of Complicity, 88 AM.
LITERATURE 665 (2016).
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fatalists. Neither sect had much truck with human agency or
law.
Wieland’s author, Charles Brockden Brown, was himself a
son of Quakers, a small sect of pacifists who valued individual
spiritual experience, but denied Calvinist doctrines of
predestination and original sin.297 It is hard not to read the
novel as an indictment of Calvinism’s doctrines of predestination
and divine vengeance, which seem to goad Wieland to murder.
Perhaps the foreign-born Carwin, whose disembodied voices sow
such confusion, is a figure of Catholicism, another target of
Quaker dissenters; and yet, such a reading over-simplifies. Fate
plays a devious role in the story, rolling coincidence into tragedy,
emphasizing, rather than disproving, the Calvinist doctrine that
humans, no matter how good or innocent, are powerless to
change their destiny. It is also hard not to read the novel as a
lesson about the fragility of individual intuition, the uncertainty
of experiencing divine communication, and the dangerous
insularity of the small congregation—all of which must have
been key features of Brown’s own Quaker home-life. Brown may
also have had in mind the witch trials of the century before, so
evocative of the difficulty in determining whether inspiration is
divine, demonic, or invented—a problem that was still a danger
in the Yates and Beadle murders in his own day, and, as the
cases above bear out, in our own.
One might also be tempted to read the novel as advocating
an age of reason, in a narrative argument against revelation.
For contemporaries Jefferson and Adams, and many others in
the founding age, the emphasis was on moral actions and virtue,
not on religious experience or theological doctrines. They
believed that science, nature, reason, and God were all aligned
(as did Kant), and, like Brown’s own Quaker family, rejected
Calvinism’s idea of the elect and the God-fated evil-doer. 298
Thomas Paine took this empiricism even farther, rejecting all
creed and clergy, prefiguring the secular individualism later
apparent in Emerson’s Transcendentalism: “My own mind is my
own church.”299
297. GAUSTAD & SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 132–38.
298. Id.
299. Thomas Paine, Age of Reason, pt. 1, § 1, THOMAS PAINE,
http://www.ushistory.org/paine/reason/reason1.htm (last visited Apr. 18,
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However, Brown’s novel seems an indictment of a cult of
reason as well: Pleyel’s strictly scientific disposition does not
prevent him from being led astray by voices, nor allow him to
predict and prevent the murders, and the richly symbolic bust of
Cicero, around which the little intellectual community gathered,
lies smashed by the novel’s end. Throughout, the novel points to
the difficulty that any of us have discerning truth, condemned
as we are always to the first-person viewpoint. Despite
Enlightenment emphasis on universal truths, strong American
individualism invites an intuitionism that emphasizes miracle
and individual experience over science and history. Wieland
rides this solipsistic reality divide in a kind of post-modernism
that has recommended the novel to contemporary critics. 300
However, even post-modernism is indicted here. Wieland’s
violent destruction of idols is uncomfortably close to Walter
Benjamin’s concept of myth- and law-destroying “divine
violence,” which purges false human versions (idols) of law,
justice, and sovereignty in order to eliminate the injustice they
perpetuate by virtue of their apparent-but-false justice.301
Wieland, then, is also a figure of the dark side of revelation as
revolution.
The cacophony of religious voices that Brown explores does
not end with him. The next generation and the Second Great
Awakening coincided with a time when the protestant
denominations divided over slavery, with the southern schisms
declaring slavery to be Bible-based and deriding their northern
counterparts as political and influenced by foreign interpretive
doctrines rather than the Biblical text.302 As religion historians
Gaustad and Schmidt put it, “[l]ike a rag doll, the Bible was
tossed back and forth, now quoted to support slavery, now to
2019).
300. See, e.g., Christine Hedlin, “Was there not Reason to Doubt?”:
Wieland and its Secular Age, 48 J. AM. STUDS. 735 (2014).
301. See JAMES R. MARTEL, DIVINE VIOLENCE: WALTER BENJAMIN AND THE
ESCHATOLOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY 51–52 (2011).
302. GAUSTAD & SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 189–96. Methodists split in
1844, Abolition and the Splintering of the Church, PBS: THIS FAR BY FAITH,
https://www.pbs.org/thisfarbyfaith/journey_2/p_5.html, Baptists in 1845,
Baptist Church, OHIO HISTORY CENT., http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/w/Ba
ptist_Church; Presbyterians in 1857, 7 The Schism of 1861, AM. PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH, http://www.americanpresbyterianchurch.org/apc-history/presbyteria
n-history/the-schism-of-1861/.
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attack it.”303
In Caleb Smith’s analysis of the rhetorics of rule of law and
religious resistance in the context of American slavery, he draws
attention to a related intra-evangelical controversy: There was
concern in nineteenth-century protestant abolitionist churches
that fiery, judgmental religious rhetoric may have inspired deific
decree murderers and ignited other violent acts.304 Some
establishment ministers in the first half of the 1800s, like
Lyman Beecher, argued for a calmer and more reasoned
approach to preaching.305 According to Smith, these moderate
preachers advocated a more law-based form of discernment that
emphasized: (1) historical models (church doctrine, common law,
Biblical interpretation, and church authority); (2) emotional
intensity but not enthusiasm or evil speaking; (3) whether acts
of love or violence are encouraged; (4) whether good works are
emphasized rather than just feeling good; and (5) humility about
one’s interpretive conclusions from divine inspiration.306 While
Smith is concerned about the church establishment’s silencing
of passionate abolitionist preaching, and its efforts to rechannel
religious calls for the violent overthrow of slavery into

303. GAUSTAD & SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at 191.
304. SMITH, supra note 23, at 129.
305. See generally Letter from Dr. Beecher to Mr. Beman (Dec. 15, 1827),
in LETTERS OF THE REV. DR. BREECHER AND REV. MR. NETTLETON, ON THE “NEW
MEASURES” IN CONDUCTING REVIVALS OF RELIGION 80 (1828); CATHERINE
BREKUS, STRANGERS AND PILGRIMS: FEMALE PREACHING IN AMERICA 1740-1845
(1998) (makes the case for Smith’s take, above); C HARLES CHAUNCEY ET AL.,
ENTHUSIASM DESCRIBED AND CAUTIONED AGAINST (1742); BENJAMIN DOOLITTLE,
AN ENQUIRY INTO ENTHUSIASM (1743); Elijah Hedding, Self Government, in
SERMONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS 13 (2d ed., 1859); SMITH, supra note 23,
at 240–41 (referencing to Chamberlayne’s pamphlet); Elijah Hedding, The
Substance of an Address Delivered to the Oneida Annual Conference of
Ministers of the Methodist Episcopal Church (August 31 1838). For more
references about the intra-evangelical debate over the Great Awakenings I and
II see ANN TAVES FITS, TRANCES, AND VISIONS: EXPERIENCING RELIGION AND
EXPLAINING EXPERIENCE FROM WESLEY TO JAMES (1999). Smith’s take on this
literature is that “[t]he creation of true religion, and of its distinctive styles of
public address, involved two related but different kinds of suppression: At one
level, the silencing of the unlettered, the undisciplined, and the lowly; at
another level, the authorizing self-regulation of those who spoke the truth.”
SMITH, supra note 23, at 132.
306. SMITH, supra note 23, at 129 (cautioning that “Christian imperatives
of humility and piety were used to stigmatize the feverish public performances
of women who lacked the formal education of ministers”).
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incremental compromises and non-violent demonstrations, 307
the themes of Beecher’s concern replay and rehearse the crackdown on evangelical practices also apparent in the Catholic
tradition, above. The recursion to established traditions and
hierarchies protected against a “divine violence” that may
command both fanatical murders and radical, revolutionary
calls for justice.
Both the brutal and the revolutionary forms of revelation
are peculiarly American. As historians of religion point out, the
United States has always been a protestant nation in the sense
of being prone to schism and generally committed to rebellion
against established religious institutions and professional
religious mediators—always seeking direct, personal, and
individual religious experiences in a kind of smorgasbord of
religious democracy focused on the individual’s sovereign choice
to accept a particular brand of faith.308 As one popular book
promises, in just twenty-one days, you too can be a prophet. 309
Amanda Porterfield argues that American law’s combination of
religious protectionism and deregulation pursuant to the First
Amendment promoted just such consumer-driven, “personalized
forms of spirituality.”310 Wieland is indeed an American tale of
individual revelation—against social convention, against
established churches, and against the law. The Defendant who
kills pursuant to a special mission from God may be a peculiarly
American trope: The world that fails to see my personal divine
vision is suffering from delusion, not me. I alone can see all the
world’s truths as fake news.

307. Id. at 182–84 (insinuating that Harriet Beecher Stowe’s brother’s
failure to support John Brown’s violent tactics was pusillanimous because he
limited his abolitionist goals to promoting civil disobedience in the North and
lobbying southern legislators to protect slave-family relations).
308. See Demko, supra note 12 (emphasizing the choice to follow a
particular religion should be considered rational, not insane, and pointing to
the importance of a particular person’s acceptance, e.g., of Christ as your
personal savior); see also Porterfield, supra note 232.
309. See JAMES W. GOLL, THE LIFESTYLE OF A WATCHMAN: A 21-DAY
JOURNEY TO BECOMING A GUARDIAN IN PRAYER (2017).
310. Porterfield, supra note 232.
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E. Reason is Finite, God is Infinite, Humans are Ignorant
Where does this fractured, solipsistic reality leave us?
Soren Kierkegaard,311 in Fear and Trembling, tries to grasp the
self-authenticating revelation in the context of God’s command
to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. As in the taxonomy offered
earlier, Kierkegaard contrasts the Kantian God of Reason and a
God who commands the unreasonable. The first, while infinitely
demanding, is much easier for humans to conceive. The human
who follows a God of reason, which Kierkegaard calls a “knight
of the infinite,” is willing to do his duty and to uphold a universal
law.312 The knight of the infinite may suffer for his adherence to
principle, but all reasonable beings must honor him for it. The
knight of the infinite has a duty to deliberate with other
reasonable beings, to consider the evidence, to follow precedent
and principles of discernment, but once convinced by rational
argument, the knight of the infinite needs only to follow reason,
whatever the sacrifice. These sacrifices are tragic, but they are
undeniably for the right.
However, Kierkegaard points out that religion requires a
knight of faith, not a knight of the infinite.313 Abraham is
commanded by God to sacrifice his beloved son Isaac.314 There
is no reason given for this commandment. It is not demanded by
a universal ethical principle, but is forbidden by ethics, for ethics
considers it an unjustified murder of the most heinous sort, as
well as the breach of a prior contract between Abraham and
God.315 Abraham does not doubt or complain of this command—
he consults no one, he deliberates with no one, he consults no
principles of discernment, he knows no rational debate is of use.
God has commanded it, and it must be done. Abraham’s love for
God and absolute obedience to him must come before the law,
311. This account of Kierkegaard is drawn from a discussion in my prior
article: Linda R. Meyer, I Would Kill for You: Law and Sacrifice in ‘To Kill a
Mockingbird,’ in REIMAGINING TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Umphrey & Sarat, eds.,
2011).
312. SØREN KIERKEGAARD, Fear and Trembling, (1843) https://www.soren
kierkegaard.nl/artikelen/Engels/101.%20Fear%20and%20Trembling%20book
%20Kierkegaard.pdf.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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reason, sanity, and comprehension.
Like Wieland, Abraham has no guarantee that the request
is divine rather than demonic; he must recognize the command
of itself. He must do without Kant, who asserts that we only
recognize God because he is good. However, what if Abraham is
mistaken? He has nothing but his own faith to reassure him
that it is God and not some demon that instructs him. If he is
mistaken:
[W]hat can save him? He suffers all the pain of
the tragic hero, he brings to naught his joy in the
world, he renounces everything . . . and perhaps
at the same instant debars himself from the
sublime joy which to him was so precious that he
would purchase it at any price. Him the beholder
cannot understand nor let his eye rest confidently
upon him.316
Yet, the marvel for Kierkegaard is not that Abraham
proceeds to follow the command, but that he believes firmly that
in doing so, all will be well—not in some other life, but in this
life.317 This faith in miracle, in the impossible and the absurd,
is what Kierkegaard admires in Abraham, but cannot achieve
himself.318
At the moment when the knight made the act of
resignation, he was convinced, humanly speaking,
of the impossibility. This was the result reached
by the understanding, and he had sufficient
energy to think it . . . . This is quite as clear to the
knight of faith, so the only thing that can save him
is the absurd, and this he grasps by faith. So he
recognizes the impossibility, and that very instant
he believes the absurd.319

316. SØREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING AND THE BOOK ON ADLER
51 (Walter Lowrie, trans., Knopf 1994).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. KIERKEGAARD, supra note 316, at 31.
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Kierkegaard thus recognizes the absurdity that seems so
much a part of revelation’s rebellion against reason, but he stops
short of accusing Abraham of insanity. Here, Kiekegaard is
defeated; he can only acknowledge human finitude and the
inability of humans to grasp the divine and to befriend God.
Conclusions
The exploration of the deific decree puzzle has taken us to
the heights of sainthood and the depths of American
individualism’s pathologies of exceptionalism. It has been a wild
ride. The Article concludes below with four comparatively
modest suggestions about handling cases of deific decree. First,
law, and perhaps religion, should exercise a jurisdictional
humility in making judgments about revelation. Second, secular
law can learn from religious practices of discernment to look
more broadly at the life and practices of a defendant asserting a
deific decree experience. Third, the distinction between direct
divine command and religious or secular law that is present in
the deific decree cases is an important one, emphasizing that
most disputes we characterize as disputes between religion and
law are intra-legal, not true disputes between law and
revelation. Fourth, law should not recognize a deific decree
defense beyond M’Naghten, not because it would establish a
church (for deific decree murders purport to establish no law,
religious or secular), but because law has no jurisdiction to
evaluate revelation.
Humility
The deific decree cases do not have the happy ending of the
Abraham and Isaac story. God does not stop these murders at
the last minute, and even though many of these defendants
testify to feeling a kind of contentment or consolation after their
crimes rather than suffering guilt (as does Wieland), we strongly
suspect that feeling is false. We may be wrong about that
assessment, and it may be that their confidence in the divinity
of their actions turns out to be justified in some other world.
However, the probabilities seem slim, even assuming the
premises of a religious afterlife, if God turns out not to be a moral
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monster, or if, as Aquinas would have it, we believe that reason
gives us at least some insight into the divine as well as into the
temporal. Perhaps that is why Isaac Watts, in his treatise on
logic for religious children, concludes that divine revelation
“belongs only to a few Favourites of Heaven . . . and not to the
Bulk of Mankind.”320 For the Bulk of us, perhaps, humility and
adherence to reason are the safer course.
The first conclusion this Article draws is that humans have
both a religious and legal duty of humility—to presume that we
are not the chosen one and that we should not be quick to treat
ourselves as an exception to the human rule of right and wrong.
There are many reasons for a rule of reluctance to believe in
one’s cosmic importance—we know that we are prone to
grandiosity, and such over-estimation of our own exceptionalism
is all-too-unexceptional.321 We are all quick to believe that we
are special and even magical,322 and one of the attractions of
religion is that it gives us that reassurance. Underneath all,
perhaps, is the so very human longing for eros, the desire to be
loved deeply and passionately as a unique and irreplaceable
person, and a longing for a personal destiny that gives life
meaning. Nevertheless, while we know eros can lead to some of
the worst crimes in pursuit of the beloved (as Weiland’s
passionate desire to win divine favor evinces), eros is in itself no
excuse. Humility counsels caution in believing that we are God’s
chosen instrument.
I was moved by the response of the reporter who, in 1796,
recounted the confession of John Yates. In December 1781,
Yates spent a quiet night with friends and family, studying the
Bible and singing hymns.323 He was affectionate to his wife and
children, and talked about how he looked forward to returning
his brother’s visit soon in his new sleigh.324 Only a few hours
later, Yates recounted being visited by two spirits, and he was

320. WATTS, supra note 105, at 182.
321. See accounts of the Dunning-Kruger effect and “Jerusalem
Syndrome.” See also NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND
TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS (2001) (explaining how agency bias causes us to
overestimate our power to control events).
322. I am still waiting for that letter from Hogwarts.
323. Beadle & Yates, supra note 259.
324. Id.
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told to “destroy his idols.”325 He burned his Bible, took an axe to
his brand-new sleigh and horses, and hunted down and killed
his wife and children, even as they begged for mercy.326 He
refused to repent ever afterwards, and though “he expressed
much sorrow for the loss of his dear family,” he insisted that he
had done the deeds “in obedience to thy commands” and “for thy
glory.”327 The reporter, at a loss for explanation, concludes:
But what avail our conjectures, perhaps it is best
that some things are concealed from us, and the
only use we can now make of our knowledge of his
affair, is to be humble under a scene of human
frailty to renew our petition, “Lead us not into
temptation.”328
A similar comment appears in the sentencing of Nat Turner.
After the judge reminds him of his guilt for the deaths of
“helpless women,” “infant children,” and of the “bosom
associates” he misled to their destruction: “Borne down by this
load of guilt, your only justification is, that you were led away by
fanaticism. If this be true, from my soul I pity you; and while you
have my sympathies, I am nevertheless called upon to pass the
sentence of the court.”329
So, let’s say we have a religious and legal duty to be humble
about our exceptional character and an obligation to presume,
not lightly defeasible, that we are part of “the Bulk of Mankind”
subject to Kant’s kingdom of ends. A defendant claiming to kill
by deific decree, then, should have an impossibly high burden of
proof.
Taking Religious Law Seriously
Law could also borrow some of the other lessons learned by
the churches in their long tradition of confronting the problem
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/6

Id.
Id.
Beadle & Yates, supra note 259, at 20, 28.
Id.
CONFESSIONS, supra note 238, at 54–55.
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of revelation versus insanity. For example, Catholic practice
looks to the general mental health and reliability of the
purported visionary as an important test of the miraculous. The
history of mental illness and other delusions of the defendant
should be relevant, and we should not pinpoint our
determination of insanity so specifically to the final act of killing
that this general background is not considered. As in the case of
Guiteau, whom Judge Cox instructed could not escape conviction
if his mental state in general was clear and rational,330 Mr.
Turgeon should be convicted, but Mr. Singleton and Mrs. Archie,
who suffered long from many forms of delusions and
dislocations, should be acquitted as insane. While the deific
decree should not be, on its own, evidence of insanity, the many
other instances of delusion should and can inform the question
of when the law may decide to treat a sincerely held religious
belief as an instance of insanity.
All faith traditions also emphasize the need to compare the
vision or prophecy with good deeds and good works. Even if God
is not bound by human law or ethical practice, God is usually
and probably, insofar as humans can know, aligned with ethical
practice. Even the evangelical traditions that most support
contemporary personal divine revelation are likely to attribute
a deific decree to murder to be the product of confusion, selfdelusion, narcissism, or insanity rather than a genuine
revelation. If one can speak of evidentiary burdens in a
revelatory context, the burden of proof of divine authority for
murder is so heavy that one’s personal conviction may never
alone be sufficient, Abraham, Nat Turner, and Joan of Arc
notwithstanding. In G.B. Shaw’s tongue-in-cheek ending to his
play Saint Joan, after her rehabilitation and sainthood, Jane
suggests she may come back to life. Immediately, all her
supporters find flimsy excuses to desert her. For while we may
be perfectly happy to declare Joan a saint post mortem, we would
not want to resurrect her to disrupt our politics, churches, legal

330. Guiteau v. United States, 10 F. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1882); see also
MIDELFORT, supra note 41, at 191 (noting that according to the 1472 treatise
De Maleficiis, by Italian jurist Angelus Aretinus, when insanity was
intermittent, “a previous condition of madness shifted the burden of proof to
the accuser, who had to prove that the offense occurred during a lucid
interval”).

81

ARTICLE 6_MEYER_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

826

PACE LAW REVIEW

8/23/2019 6:37 PM

Vol. 39.2

institutions, and lives.331
All faith traditions also impose some obligation of expert
intersubjectivity—whether the check on revelation be another
parishioner, a pastor, or an official papal committee of inquiry.
The presumption of intersubjectivity is itself an ethical
imperative based on a faith tradition that God cares for all
people, not just one. Therefore, the revelations God makes to
you privately should not be substantially at variance with the
revelations (S)he has already made through tradition, history,
and divine texts available to all. The irony is, of course, that the
Bible is full of instances in which God picks out one person to
communicate with in private. Prophets are destabilizing,
usually tasked with being the bearers of bad news that strikes
at the heart of a religious tradition. Perhaps it is the deepest
irony that it is only with the greatest trepidation that any faith
tradition acknowledges as divine a person’s private vision that
changes the course of traditional religio-ethical practice or
allows breach of an ethical rule. While Turgeon did check his
revelation with his co-defendant, the isolation and idiosyncratic
nature of their church enhances the danger of solipsism and
delusion, as in Wieland. Even an ecclesiastical court, then,
would likely condemn Turgeon’s act and deny it a divine origin.
God v. Law
The deific decree cases thus illuminate for us the difference
between religious law and direct experience of the divine. The
deific decree cases always distinguish between defendants who
assert that church law or moral doctrine requires them to kill,
and defendants who assert a direct prophetic vision—a direct
command from God to kill. In the case of cultural or religious
doctrinal conflict, at least in the context of murder, no deific
decree defense has been recognized. The courts have recognized
implicitly that those who disagree with law’s reason are
asserting a version of a cultural defense and must convince their
fellow citizens that the law is wrong, not ask for exceptions from
the courts. The deific decree doctrine, if it exists, extends only
to one acting under the direct, personal command of God to
331. SHAW, supra note 231.
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commit a specific crime. This distinction between religious law
and deific command, though not well-explained in the cases, is
consistent with Justice Scalia’s view of the free exercise clause
in Employment Division v. Smith, for to exalt religious law over
secular law in judgments would be to establish a religion, not to
be humble before the possibility of the divine.332
The corollary is that, as churches become institutions, they
must, like courts, refer back to reason, consistency, text, and
authority, sound doctrine, and good morals, and cannot tolerate
new revelation without schism.
A church can never
acknowledge a truth based on revelation alone, if that revelation
contradicts the established church tradition—sound doctrines
and good morals—on which the institution itself depends for its
identity. Hence, any argument by a church that its law has a
divine warrant ignores the fact that, where prophets differ or are
silent or are ambivalent, prophecy must itself be sifted through
religious law in order to be recognized by the institution as
legitimate. The rules of recognition within religious law,
therefore, always place authority somewhere other than in a
new revelation itself. For example, even though the Bible is
commonly understood by Christian churches as revealed truth,
it also serves as an authoritative, highly interpreted, text that
becomes a rule for those churches to use in recognizing, or not,
new revelations. The new revelation cannot self-authenticate—

332. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(holding that the Free Exercise Clause guarantees that religious activities are
not discriminated against by law, not that they are entitled to exemptions from
“neutral generally applicable law.”). Hence, I do not think Stephen Smith’s
view, supra note 230, that free exercise belongs only to churches and not to
individual conscience, is valid. At least in the context of the criminal law, to
substitute church law for secular law directly in a criminal case where the
community is the plaintiff would entail an establishment of religious law in
place of the People’s law. To refuse to prosecute, or to pardon someone so
convicted, on the other hand, is to recognize law’s limits, and could be a means
of accommodating religious persons, among others. To exempt an individual
from a generally applicable law requiring some other action, like paying taxes
or reporting (rather than forbidding a crime) might be understood as an
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and therefore not amount to an
establishment of religion. Demko, supra note 12, at 1970–77, would likely
disagree that decrees and rules can be distinguished, and Judge Posner, in
Wilson v. Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347, 354–55 (7th Cir. 2010), would likely disagree
that treating deific decrees differently than cultural defenses would not be an
Establishment Clause violation.
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a second coming could only be authenticated by the first.
Understood in light of the deific decree doctrine’s distinction
between doctrine and decree, disputes about abortion, gay
marriage, and other divisive issues of our time are primarily
inter-religious and intra-legal doctrinal disputes about which set
of religious or moral laws should be taken up by secular law to
govern our conduct, subject to all the usual practices of reasongiving, precedent, evidence, tradition, and text-based
argumentation (though the core texts differ). The positions in
these disputes are not arguments from a self-revealing, selfauthenticating revelation. They are not disputes directly
between the secular law and God; and if they were, law would
not be capable of discerning the beyond-the-law in any event.
The best law can do is, like Pontius Pilot, wash its hands and
walk away.333
Deific Decree in Secular Courts
Looking at established religious traditions for guidance,
then, cannot avoid the legal dilemmas created by deific decree
tests: We cannot treat revelations as insanity, for that would be
to prefer atheism to religion. We cannot presume that revelation
will accord with law, for this prefers certain natural law or
traditional religious views over others. We cannot use a
religious test for determining the validity of a revelatory
experience, for the same reason (though noting the helpfulness
of religious law analogies would not, it seems to me, be
forbidden). We cannot presume that a deific decree would
supersede law, unless we would anchor all law in a selfauthenticating divine will beyond reason. Instead, we must say,
as we usually do in the context of free exercise doctrine, that we
cannot know whether divinity is or is not and, therefore, also
cannot know whether revelation is or not—such questions are
beyond the jurisdiction of law. We should, therefore, acquit only
when a person exhibits insanity in other contexts and over time.
This conclusion would rule out judging insanity in deific
decree cases by a more inclusive volitional test, as other writers

333. See MARTEL, supra note 301, at 51.
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have suggested.334 A person who sincerely claims that God has
commanded them to do an act should not be treated as insane
under any standard by virtue of that command in itself. A
related argument that would not require treating deific decree
experiences as ipso facto insane is to accord a duress-like excuse
to those who commit crimes because they are sincerely terrified
of eternal divine retribution, as long as we accorded similarly
sincere fears of danger from secular threats equal treatment.335
A duress defense in this context, however, would have the same
evidentiary and causation problems that attend volitional
insanity defenses, unless it is restricted to divine threats of
serious bodily injury, like being thrown for eternity into a lake
of fire.336 A third possibility, recently argued for by Stephen
Garvey, is to exonerate deific decree cases along with other cases
in which a defendant loses his sense of his own agency—as do
persons suffering from alien hand syndrome—though I suspect
the proof problems would rival those in volitional insanity
defenses.337 Assuming, as is likely, that courts continue to
adhere to the cognitive M’Naghten standard, however, our rule
might be that knowledge of generally accepted principles of right
and wrong, against a background of a rational, organized life,
would be enough to discount claims of insanity and to convict the
person who claims to be God’s avenging agent on earth. Where
there is no indication that someone suffers from general
disorders of thought, by itself, a conviction that “God told me to
kill” should not be a defense.338
I would not limit M’Naghten to require only knowledge of
the positive law as disproof of insanity, rather than the
traditional test of knowledge of right and wrong. Our very
presumption that ignorance of the law is no excuse
334. See Belt, supra note 8.
335. See Morris & Haroun, supra note 12, at 1048 (necessity and
duress—can an otherworldly threat of hell count?); see, e.g., State v. Blair, 732
A.2d 448 (N.H. 1999) (where the defendant killed family to avoid eternal lake
of fire).
336. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
superseded by 18 U.S.C. § 17 (reinstating M’Naghten in federal courts); United
States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
337. See Garvey, supra note 12.
338. See Morris & Haroun, supra note 12, at 1047 (stating “[i]f the
person’s belief at the time he or she acted is declared to be a religious belief
and not a delusional belief, then an insanity defense should not succeed”).
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acknowledges that we know law through ethics, not through
statute books. Moreover, if we invoke such extreme skepticism
about moral objectivity, and treat ethics as just as much beyond
legal jurisdiction as religious truth, we undermine legal reason
itself and commit ourselves to another kind of command-based
will to power that may or may not accord with right. Positive
law, if it does not have a significant link to the most commonly
accepted principles of ethics, is nothing more than a gunman
writ large, as H.L.A. Hart put it.339 A purely positivistic view of
law would require, for example, acquittal of soldiers commanded
to kill by their legally-constituted superiors, just as deific decree
doctrine would exonerate those commanded to kill by their
God.340 Positive law in its extreme form is just as selfauthenticating as deific decrees and just as resistant to
correction by conventional, reason-based, or nomos-based ideas
of right and wrong. The only difference is that a willful God is
replaced by a willful legislature.341 The deep irony with
positions that look to positive-law formulations of M’Naghten in
order to eliminate the relevance of a defendant’s subjective
understanding of right and wrong is that the same solipsistic
idea of a deific decree that unseats both legal and religious
institutions is also present in positive law as the selfauthenticating sovereign will that dissolves law into exception
and authoritarianism.342
Finally, law can admit this possibility: that if we define
insanity solely under M’Naghten, we may perhaps one day
crucify a true prophet. Many believe it would not be the first
time. But if we have the bad fortune to convict a prophet, then
at least we do so out of humility, as in John’s portrayal of the
reluctant Pontius Pilate, rather than out of derision.343 From the
339. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593, 603 (1958).
340. This observation is compatible with most “mixed” theories of positive
law (in which the rule of recognition often includes some ethical rules or
materials, or in which the positive law is generally derived from ethical
principles) as well as with most theories of natural or customary law.
341. See Nonet, supra note 169.
342. Cf. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., U.
Chi. Press 2005); MARTEL, supra note 301, at 24, 26–27.
343. The need for humility in judging crime is also a reason that I would
rule out life-without-parole and the death penalty. See LINDA R. MEYER,
SENTENCING IN TIME (2017); LINDA R. MEYER, THE JUSTICE OF MERCY (2010).
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standpoint of a convicted true prophet, imprisonment or even
execution would be immaterial, of course,344 and a martyrdom
may convince even human reason, in time, that justice requires
a radically new vision of right and wrong, or even a bloody civil
war. As John Brown put it:
Now, if it is deemed necessary that I should forfeit
my life for the furtherance of the ends of justice,
and mingle my blood further with the blood of my
children and with the blood of millions in this
slave country whose rights are disregarded by
wicked, cruel, and unjust enactments, I submit; so
let it be done!345
Where lawfulness ends, mercy and discretion may still have
a place. Law does recognize its own limitations in providing for
the pardon power, for jury nullification,346 for sentencing
discretion, and for prosecutorial discretion. These are the
practices we often use when law-as-reason runs out, and they
often mark moments of law’s origins, law’s humility, or law’s
compassion, where we cannot know, do not know, or cannot
judge. These places of the silence of law347 are where divinity
may, or may not, be lurking.

344. Demko, supra note 12 (stating “[t]he true believer will accept his fate
as ordained by God”).
345. John Brown’s Last Speech, HIST. WEAPON, https://historyisaweapon.c
om/defcon1/johnbrown.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2019).
346. See, e.g., Pando v. Fernandez, 499 N.Y.S.2d 950 (App. Div. 1986)
(reinstating a contract suit despite the trial court’s determination that the
plaintiff’s promised “saintly intervention” in helping the defendant choose
winning lottery numbers was a consideration impossible to prove. The
Appellate Court held that the contract required only the plaintiff’s best efforts
to contact the saint, and so the matter was for the jury to determine).
347. See MARIANNE CONSTABLE, JUST SILENCES: THE LIMITS AND
POSSIBILITIES OF MODERN LAW (2007); MEYER, THE JUSTICE OF MERCY (2010).

87

